

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DVAITA VEDĀNTA

BY

DR. P. NAGARAJA RAO



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THE ADYAR LIBRARY SERIES

VOLUME ONE HUNDRED AND SEVEN

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Adyar, Madras 600 020, India

First Edition 1976

27796

ISBN 0-8356-7442-8

25-2-84

Agents

Americas and Japan:

The Theosophical Publishing House,
P. O. Box 270, Wheaton,
Illinois 60187, U. S. A.

Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia and Fiji:

The Theosophical Society in Australia
121 Walker Street,
North Sydney, New South Wales 2060,
Australia.

Europe and the United Kingdom:

The Theosophical Publishing House Ltd.,
68 Great Russell Street,
London W.C. 1B 3 BU, England.

India and Other Countries:

The Theosophical Publishing House,
The Theosophical Society,
Adyar, Madras 600 020, India.

PRINTED IN INDIA

At the Vasanta Press, The Theosophical Society,
Adyar, Madras 600 020

Dedicated by the author with devotion
to the Sacred Memories of

ŚRĪ MADHVA,
Śrī Jayatīrtha, Śrī Vyāsarāja and Śrī Rāghavendra

कुरु मुङ्क्ष्व च कर्म निजं नियतं हरिपादविनम्रधिया सततम् ।
हरिरेव परो हरिरेव गुर्हरिरेव जगत्पितृमातृगतिः ॥

न ततोऽस्त्यपरं जगतीड्यतमं परमात्परतः पुरुषोत्तमतः ।
तदलं बहुलोकविचिंतनया प्रवणं कुरु मानसमीशपदे ॥

Madhva, *Dāśaśastotra*

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PREFACE

THE conception of *mokṣa* (liberation), which is the basic, dominant and practical motive of Indian philosophy, has at times overshadowed the logical subtlety, depth and skill, the power of analysis, the force of argument, the dialectical acumen and the play of reason in the Indian philosophical systems. This has led to the criticism that Indian philosophy and particularly the Vedānta, is a combination of religious faith and reason, being based primarily on the authority of the Veda-s. But in all the schools of Vedānta there are tracts devoted to the treatment of logical problems and no school accepts any of its doctrine without the appropriate logical bases.

The logic and the theory of knowledge of Indian systems of philosophy are largely coloured by their metaphysical tenets. There is no logic in the Indian philosophical systems which is not coloured by their metaphysical doctrines. The epistemology of a system is to a great extent dependent on its ontology. Śrī Madhva's logic is closely related to his theory of metaphysics and his theology.

Dr. S. K. Mitra of Calcutta University has translated an elementary treatise on Madhva's logic, the *Pramāṇacandrikā*. Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma has written a running commentary in English on Madhva's *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa* in his doctoral thesis *The Reign of Realism in*

Indian Philosophy. The present work, based on the *Pramāṇapaddhati* of Jayatīrtha, is a brief account of the Dvaita theory of knowledge. In the exposition of the theme the comparative method is not adopted in full but I have freely drawn from the other works of Jayatīrtha which are commentaries on Madhva's works. In dealing with the logical categories of Madhva, I have compared them with those of the other systems of Indian philosophy.

My main inspiration for the study of Madhva's philosophy was the late Śrī Satyadhyana Tīrtha of Uttaradi Mutt.

My grateful thanks are due to Pandits Yellatur Narasimhachar and Kowligi Yadunathachar who have helped me in the preparation of the work; to the late S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri who taught me the metaphysical and logical approach to Vedānta; to the late Professor Hiriyanna whose suggestions helped me in revising the work; to Dr. V. Raghavan for reading the proofs and making valuable suggestions; and to Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja for going through the work. I am also thankful to the Adyar Library for undertaking to publish it.

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INTRODUCTION

S'RĪ Madhva's Dvaita Vedānta is a pluralistic, theistic and realistic system. It derives its philosophical tenets from the three authoritative *prasthāna-s* or basic texts (the Upaniṣad-s, the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Vedānta-sūtra-s*), from the Purāṇa-s, and the *Mahābhārata*.

Madhva declares in many of his works that he is the prophet of Lord Viṣṇu, chosen to interpret correctly the sacred texts and refute the misinterpretations foisted thereon by other commentators. On the strength of a hymn in the *Rgveda* called the *Balitthā-sūkta*,¹ Vāyu is hailed by Madhva as the greatest of souls (*jīvottama*). Vāyu is the mediator between God and man. In the Dvaita Vedānta, Vāyu occupies the position of the Christ in Christianity. It is said that Lord Viṣṇu refuses to take anything that has not come through Vāyu. He appeared on this planet thrice as the agent of Viṣṇu. The first incarnation (*avatāra*) of Vāyu was Hanumān, the second Bhīma and the third Madhva.²

¹ *Rgveda*, I. 21. 141.

² यस्य त्रीण्युदितानि वेदवचने रूपाणि दिव्यान्यलं
बद्धतद्दर्शतमित्यमेव निहितं देवस्य मर्गो महत् ।
वायो रामवचोनयं प्रथमकं पृक्षो द्वितीयं वपु-
र्मध्वो यत्तु तृतीयकं कृतमिदं माष्यं हरौ तेन हि ॥

Found at the end of several works of Madhva in *Sarvamūlam* (SM), ed. Rāmācārya and Kṛṣṇācārya, Nirṇaya Sagar Press, 1892.

There is a traditional verse condensing the nine leading tenets of Madhva's system:

श्रीमन्मध्वमते हरिः परतरः सत्यं जगत्तत्त्वतो

मेदो जीवगणा हरेरनुचरा नीचोच्चभाव गताः ।

मुक्तिर्नैजसुखानुभूतिरमला भक्तिश्च तत्साधनं

द्वक्षादित्रितयं प्रमाणमखिलान्नायैकवेद्यो हरिः ॥

1. Viṣṇu is the Supreme God mentioned in the scriptures. He is the prime import (*mahātātparya*) of them all. Madhva asserts that every word in the language primarily signifies Viṣṇu and refers only secondarily to other objects. This assumption greatly helps him in harmonizing the import of the scriptures. The Purāṇa-s which praise Śiva as the Supreme Deity are set at naught by him. Viṣṇu is the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) of the universe. He presides over creation, preservation and destruction. He is the liberator from, as well as the cause of, the bondage of *saṃsāra* (chain of existence). Nescience (*avidyā*), action (*karman*) and the subtle body (*līṅga-śarīra*) are the secondary causes of the chain of existence.

2. The external world is affirmed to be ultimately real (*satya*). It continues to exist at all times. The world process is beginningless and eternal (*anādi* and *nitya*).

3. The ultimate reality of the fivefold difference, namely, the difference between God and soul (*Īśvara* and *jīva*), between soul and soul (*jīva* and *jīva*), between God and matter, between soul and matter and between matter and matter, is accepted.

4. All souls are dependent on God who alone is independent.

5. Among the souls there is gradation. There are three kinds of souls: those that are fit for liberation (*muktiyogya-s*), those that travel endlessly through the cycle of birth and rebirth (*nityasaṁsārin-s*), and those that are fit to be eternally in hell (*tamoyogya-s*).

6. Liberation (*mokṣa*) is the realization of the soul's innate bliss.

7. Devotion is the means (*sādhana*) to it. Devotion is that kind of attachment to the Lord which is based on a complete understanding of His supremacy, transcending the love for one's own self and possessions and remaining unshaken under all circumstances.¹ Besides devotion, the Lord's desire to protect the devotee is also necessary for liberation.

8. There are three means of valid knowledge: perception, inference and verbal testimony.

9. The existence of God is known only by correct methods of reasoning.

The devotee seeking liberation should first of all act without desire for obtaining possessions. Actions performed without any selfish motive are called *nivṛtti-karma*. The hearing of the scriptures (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*), profound meditation (*nididhyāsana*) and

¹ परमेश्वरभक्तिर्नाम निरवधिकानन्तानवद्यकल्याणगुणत्वज्ञानपूर्वकः स्वात्मात्मीय-
समस्तवस्तुभ्योऽनेकगुणाधिकोऽन्तरायसहस्रेणाप्यप्रतिबद्धो निरन्तरप्रेमप्रवाहः । Jaya-
tīrtha, *Nyāyasudhā*, ed. Rāmācārya and Kṛṣṇācārya, Nirṇaya Sagar
Press, 1867, fo. 17.

adherence to the duties ordained by the scriptures, lead the devotee to the immediate cognition (*aparokṣa-jñāna*) of Viṣṇu.

Madhva has briefly expounded the epistemology of his system in a short work called *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa*. This work appears to comprise only a few disjointed and broken sentences interspersed with a string of apparently irrelevant quotations from various books, including passages from a nonexistent and untraceable work on logic called *Brahmatarka* attributed to Bādarāyaṇa, who, according to Madhva, was an incarnation of Viṣṇu.

There is an elaborate commentary on this work by Jayatīrtha who also wrote an independent manual of the epistemology of Madhva's system, the *Pramāṇapaddhati*. It occupies the same place in Dvaita Vedānta as the *Mānameyodaya* in Mīmāṃsā, the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* in Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* in Advaita.

The present exposition is based entirely on the *Pramāṇapaddhati* (PP) and its eight commentaries (published in Dharwar) and treats of various aspects of Madhva's theory of knowledge. Where necessary his criticism of rival theories is discussed. Jayatīrtha's *Nyāyasudhā*¹ has been consulted for the discussion in certain chapters.

¹ Madhva wrote two commentaries on the *Vedānta-sūtra-s*. One of them is called the *Anuvyākhyāna* and contains 1900 verses. It is very terse. Jayatīrtha's commentary on it, the *Nyāyasudhā*, is the greatest classic of Dvaita philosophy.

I

THE CONCEPT OF DEFINITION

ACCORDING to Jayatīrtha, Definition is a statement of the characteristic (*dharma*) which is invariably present in all the defined objects and absent in objects other than the defined. The term 'invariably'

Definition of
Definition

lays stress on the distinguishing trait being present in all the objects belonging to the same class as the defined. A *dharma* which satisfies only one of the two factors does not form a definition, for example, in the statement 'the cow is a horned animal'. This cannot be a definition since horns are found in animals other than the cow. If the second factor is also introduced into the definition of *dharma*, there will not be the defect of overpervasion. The characteristic which satisfies both the factors is the dewlap, with regard to the definition of the cow.

The purpose of a definition is to facilitate our understanding of objects in their distinctive individuality and independence. Definition marks off one class from another, each retaining its independence, and differentiates one individual from another within the limits of the given class. Some hold that the one purpose of definition is individualization of entities. It synthesizes the

Purpose of
Definition

features of a class and the distinctive characteristics of the individuals coming under it. Definition also serves the purpose of communication by helping us to attach names to the objects defined. Thus he who knows the definition 'the cow is an animal possessing a dewlap, etc.', finds that the animal with a dewlap, etc., is to be named 'cow'.

In traditional western logic, definition proceeds on the principle *per genus et differentiam*. A definition should state the proximate genus. This fact points out that the defined is a species coming under the genus stated. The differentia consist of the quality or qualities which distinguish the defined from the species that are coordinate with it. We have seen that the purpose of the definition according to Indian logicians also is to differentiate the defined object from other members of its own class, and from the members of other classes.

According to the Nyāya school, definition is based on the presence of the generic attribute or the universal in all the objects belonging to the same class as the defined. There are two kinds of universals. One is the highest universal or *summun genus* (*parā jāti*), which is named *sattā*. The other is *aparā jāti*, which is many in number, such as 'potness', 'clothness', etc. *Jāti* is defined as 'one inherent in many things and eternal'. It abides in Substance, Quality and Action. It is this common element (*anugata-dharma*) found in objects that makes us cognize all the objects belonging to the same class as the defined.

Definition in
western logic

Nyāya theory of
the Universal

The existence of such a universal held by the Naiyāyika-s calls for criticism. If the universal is assumed as one and eternal, what happens to the universal 'potness' when a pot is broken? It cannot be destroyed, because it is eternal. Nor can it be said that a part of it is lost, for it is impartite. The Naiyāyika tells us that it abides in Time. The question now arises whether it was not in Time that the pot was existent. Many have criticized the Nyāya view of the universal.¹ According to Madhva, the universal of the Nyāya school is only an attribute (*dharma*) and not a separate category. For instance, the 'manness' in each individual is different. When an individual dies the 'manness' in him alone is destroyed.² Thus Madhva repudiates the Nyāya conception of the universal, and admits a number of attributes in its place. So 'potness' and 'clothness' are only individual attributes and not universals.

Madhva holds that all attributes, such as quality, action and the universal, are of the very nature of the

¹ See *Mānameyodaya*, section on *jāti*; and *Indian Culture*, vol. 1, no. 3 (Jan. 1935), article on "A Buddhist Estimate of Universals".

² नरत्वादिकमप्येवं तत्तद्धर्मतयेयते ।
न सर्वधर्म एकोऽस्ति समुदायस्तु भिन्नगः ॥
एतादृशं च सादृश्यं पदार्थेषु पृथक् पृथक् ।
एकस्मिन् स विनष्टेऽपि यतोऽन्यत्रैव दृश्यते ॥
कुतो भस्मत्वमाप्तस्य नरत्वं पुनरिष्यते ।

substance in which they abide.¹ Some of them exist concurrently with the substance (*yāvad-dravya-bhāvi*). Their relation to the substance is identity. There are some other attributes which do not continue to exist as long as the substance exists. These are termed *ayāvad-dravya-bhāvi* or *khaṇḍita*. The relation between attributes and their substances may be either identity and difference, or solely identity.

The relation of the threads of a cloth to the cloth is a case of identity and difference. Identity exists only when the cloth is existent. If the threads were removed from the cloth, the relation cannot be one of identity, because only the threads remain and not the cloth. The cloth belongs to the past (*atīta*), and the threads alone are seen in the present (*vidyamāna*). So their relation now is one of difference. Thus at one particular time the relation of the cloth to the threads was 'identity', but now it is 'difference'. The case of a pot and the attribute 'potness' is an example of the relation of identity only.

¹ गुणक्रियाजातिपूर्वा धर्माः सर्वेऽपि वस्तुनः ।
 रूपमेव द्विधं तच्च यावद्रस्तु च खण्डितम् ॥
 खण्डिते मेद ऐक्यं च यावद्रस्तु न मेदवत् ।
 खण्डितं रूपमेवात्र विकारोऽपि विकारिणः ॥
 कार्यकारणयोश्चैव तयैव गुणतद्वतोः ।
 क्रियान्क्रियावतोस्तद्वत्तथा जातिविशेषयोः ॥

Objects and their attributes are entirely different from each other.¹ Then how do we distinguish the various attributes which are identical with their objects? It is to explain this that Madhva posits the category of particularities (*viśeṣa-s*).² They are many in number. They exist in every object unlike the *viśeṣa-s* of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school which are present only in eternal substances. The *viśeṣa-s* are self-differentiating (*svatovyāvartaka*). It is they that help us to cognize the attributes which though having a relation of identity with their substances, are yet different from them.

Madhva explains the need for assuming the separate category of *viśeṣa* apart from the substance. He says that there are three factors in the cognition of a substance. In the cognition of a pot, for example, the form of the cognition is 'this is a pot' (*ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ*). In this cognition there is that which is denoted by 'this' (*idaṃ-padārtha*), the adjunct (*prakāra*) which is 'potness' (*ghaṭatva*), and the relation between them (*saṃsarga*). Though this cognition gives us an apprehension of all

¹ भिन्नाश्च भिन्नधर्माश्च पदार्था निखिल्य अपि ।

Anuvyākhyāna, SM, vol. I, fo. 183.

² भेदहीने त्वपर्यायशब्दान्तरनियामकः ।

विशेषो नाम कथितः सोऽस्ति वस्तुष्वशेषतः ॥

विशेषास्तेऽप्यनन्ताश्च परस्परविशेषिणः ।

स्वनिर्वाहकतायुक्ताः सन्ति वस्तुष्वशेषतः ॥

Ibid., SM, vol. I, fo. 162.

these aspects, it does not tell us anything about the substrate being either different or otherwise from the attribute. Perception gives us the knowledge that the pot has colour (*rūpavān ghaṭaḥ*). But it never gives us the knowledge that the pot and the colour are different (*ghaṭād rūpaṃ bhinnam*). In other words perception can never give us the knowledge of the exact nature of the relation fixing one relatum as substrate and the other as attribute. Moreover, certain substrates are eternal and their attributes are also eternal. Substrates and attributes are also sometimes identical. In such cases we do not have any basis of distinction to call one the substrate and the other the attribute. We cannot here say that the substance itself gives us the cognition. To say so would be to beg the question, because we do not know which is the substrate and which the attribute. It is in order to explain such facts that the special category called *viśeṣa* is posited.

According to Madhva definition proceeds on the basis of similarity (*sādrśya*). When we define a cow as an animal having a dewlap, the definition helps us to cognize all animals with dewlaps as cows. This cognition is based on the similarity of dewlaps abiding in different individuals of the cow class.

Similarity is an independent category. It is defined as *ekanirūpitāpara-vṛtti*, i.e., while being determined by one it is present in others; though its determinant is one, it is not one and the same in all. Madhva holds that though it is prolix to admit plurality of similarities,

Similarity as basis
of Definition

yet the concept of similarity is unintelligible otherwise. If A and B are similar, A's similarity to B is different from B's similarity to A. The argument that it is one and the same similarity that abides in both is not tenable. For example, take the statement: "The face is similar to the moon." Here the moon is the determinant (*nirūpaka*) and the locus of similarity is the face. The position is reversed in the analogy, "The moon is similar to the face". Here the face is the determinant and the locus of similarity is the moon. Owing to the difference in the determinants and their respective *loci*, it has to be granted that the two similarities are also different.

The relation of a word with its meaning too is known only through similarity. The meaning of a word, whether universal or particular, cannot be explained through the help of the generic attribute.¹ According to the Nyāya school, a universal has no universal and particularity has no particularity. So the definition on the basis of generality is possible only for the first three categories, i.e., Substance, Quality and Action. The categories that have no universality cannot be defined in the same manner. This leads the Nyāya school to adopt two separate methods to explain definition. In doing so they fall victim to the defect of prolixity.

¹ इति व्युत्पत्तिरपि हि सादृश्येनैव गम्यते ।

सर्वेषु युगपच्छब्दः सदृशेषु प्रवर्तते ॥

.....

जातितश्चेत् कथं तासु तत्र चेदनवस्थितिः ॥

II

PRAMĀṆA-S

The Definition of Pramāṇa

THE greatest yearning of the human soul is for the eternal and unmixed bliss of *mukti* or liberation, which, according to Madhva, is attained when the limitations fettering the soul drop off, through the Grace of the Lord, the warrant and prop of our existence. The Grace of the Lord, the most potent factor in the attainment of liberation, comes through constant devotion. Such devotion is possible only when we have knowledge of the Lord (the object of our devotion), the greatest of the objects to be apprehended by human intelligence. Knowledge of Him is possible only through the instruments of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa-s*). This is the justification and need for the detailed study of the nature and the validity of the *pramāṇa-s* in the philosophy of Dvaita.

Madhva draws attention to the two meanings of the word *pramāṇa* namely, 'knowledge' (*pramā*), and the 'instruments of knowledge' (*pramā-karaṇa*). In order to avoid any confusion, he applies the term *kevalapramāṇa* to knowledge and the term *anupramāṇa* to the means.

Necessity for the
study of Pramāṇa-s

Definition of
Pramāṇa

The general definition of *pramāṇa* is given as *yathārtha* which means 'that which does not go beyond' (*yathā*) 'the object of knowledge' (*artha*). *Pramāṇa* is then that which apprehends the object of knowledge as it exists and not otherwise. This definition of *pramāṇa* may, at first sight, appear to be overpervasive in respect of the cognizer (*pramātā*) and the cognized (*prameya*), though it is not really so. For the knower and the known are only causes (*kāraṇa-s*) of knowledge and not instruments (*sādhana-s*). As they are not instruments, they are not *pramāṇa-s*.¹ Thus a *pramāṇa* is that which is chiefly and distinctively responsible for knowledge and which is an instrument, not merely a cause.

Kevalapramāṇa is defined as that knowledge which does not go beyond its object (*yathārtha-jñāna*). There is thus no overpervasion in respect of 'Doubt' and 'Error' and their instruments. *Anupramāṇa* is the instrument that enables us to have valid knowledge (*yathārthajñāna-sādhana*).

What is the necessity for Madhva to formulate a definition applicable to *anupramāṇa-s* also? Cannot a definition applicable to knowledge be extended figuratively to the instruments of knowledge as well? Madhva's answer to the question is that the term to be defined is *pramāṇa*. It has two 'expressed senses'. One is *pramā* and the other *pramā-kāraṇa*. Grammar admits of the

Single definition
justified

¹ PP, p. 39: ज्ञेयविषयीकारित्वेनैव प्रमातृप्रमेययोर्व्यवच्छेदः । तयोः साक्षाज्ज्ञेयविषयीकारित्वाभावात् । साक्षाज्ज्ञेयविषयीकारिकारणत्वेऽपि तत्साधनत्वाभावाच्च ।

formation of the word in both senses. So there is no justification for a definition applicable to only one of these two meanings, both of which are 'expressed', and to the figurative extension of it to the other. According to Pāṇini, the suffix here is *lyuṭ* which is found in the form of *ana*. The suffix *lyuṭ* can be used without attaching any extra meaning to that of the stem. In this case the word *pramāṇa* and *pramā* are synonyms. The suffix can also mean 'instrument', in which case *pramāṇa* expresses the sense of 'instrument of *pramā*'. Yet these two meanings are not entirely unrelated. Hence a single definition applicable to both is justified.

Madhva classifies all knowledge into three groups: valid knowledge, error and doubt. He brings dream knowledge and recollection under valid knowledge as the objects cognized through them are real. The criteria which determine the reality of any object are its existence, temporarily at least, and its nonsublation. Only those objects that have never existed are unreal. The materials of dream objects are the impressions (*vāsanā-s*) of our past experiences deposited in the mind (*manas*). These impressions are responsible for *saṃsāra* as well as for dreams. Though dreams are destroyed on waking, dream objects are yet real, because they satisfy the criteria of reality mentioned above. The element of unreality in dreams is the identification of dream objects with the objects in the external world to which they seem to correspond.¹

¹ For a full discussion of the subject, see chapter III.

Recollection (*smṛti*) is also valid knowledge. It is originated by the mind (*manas*) and not by the impressions in the mind as the Nyāya school holds. For though the Nyāya school accepts that the mind is an instrument, it does not allot to it any specific function. The Mādhva-s too regard the mind as an instrument and ascribe to it the function of recollection. Without some such specific function the mind cannot be considered as an instrument. Thus with regard to recollection, the mind is the instrument (*karana*) and the impressions its function (*vyāpāra*), and it is valid because the object recollected existed, at the time when it was experienced, in the form found in recollection. It need not have existence at the time of recollection for its validity.

Now the question may be raised: How can the mind with the help of impressions have contact with past or nonexistent objects, as contact is possible only between two existents? The reply to this is that contact is possible even with nonexistent objects. For instance, there is the cognition of a nonexistent (*asat*) such as the horns of a hare. This can be mediate as well as immediate. On being told that the horns of a hare are nonexistent, we understand the meaning of those words. If this were denied, the words would cease to be words. On this account we have to admit the mediate cognition of the nonexistent (*parokṣa-pratīti*).

In all cases of delusion there is an immediate perception of the nonexistent. In the example of

nacre appearing as silver, there is no silver in the nacre, as it does not have the utility of silver; yet we perceive the silver. Thus the immediate cognition of the nonexistent is also possible. Similarly in the case of recollection also the mind, aided by the impressions, has contact with past objects which are nonexistent at the time of recollection.

According to the Prābhākara school all experience (*anubhava*) is *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge). Experience is knowledge other than recollection.

Prābhākara
view and its
rejection

In this school, the word *pramāṇa* means 'valid knowledge' and not 'the means of valid knowledge'. Recollection is regarded as invalid knowledge inasmuch as it stands in need of a previous cognition. But this definition is too comprehensive as it includes doubt and error under valid knowledge. It excludes all *anupramāṇa*-s, including the Veda-s, and is thus nonpervasive.¹

The Bhāṭṭa school defines *pramāṇa* as that knowledge which is instrumental in enabling us to

Bhāṭṭa view
examined

apprehend that 'special luminosity' (*prakāśa-viśeṣa*) which abides in the objects cognized. The distinctive luminousness of being known of which the Bhāṭṭa-s speak has no warrant for its existence. It has no locus where there is knowledge of objects of the past or the future as in the case of a broken pot or an uncreated pot. It is meaningless to talk of the distinctive luminousness as abiding in an object when the object itself is not in

¹ See PP, p. 81.

existence. Further, the definition does not include recollection and the *anupramāṇa-s* and is therefore non-pervasive.¹

The Advaita school of Vedānta defines *pramāṇa* as the cognition which has for content an entity that is not already known and is not sublated (*anadhigata-abādhitārtha-jñāna*). The characteristics of *pramāṇa* are 'novelty' and 'nonsublation'. It is not sufficient that knowledge should be true; it is also necessary that the content of knowledge should be new, or previously unacquired. If we accept this as a criterion of *pramāṇa*, our second and subsequent cognitions of objects will have to be accepted as invalid. Even a continuous stream of cognition (*dhārāvāhika-jñāna*) turns out to be invalid because the cognition of the second moment has a content which is already known at the first moment (*adhigata-viṣaya*). If we take nonsublation

Advaita view
untenable

as a test of *pramāṇa*, the definition is overpervasive in respect of erroneous knowledge of the *sopādhika* type (delusion caused by the presence of an external adjunct, e.g., the white crystal seen as red because of the proximity of a red flower) because it is not sublated. Further, judged by the criterion of nonsublation, every cognition proves to be invalid because it is sublated by other subsequent cognitions.² Besides the definition

¹ *Ibid.*, loc. cit.

² The Advaitin might retort thus: The overpervasion deduced by Madhva is not valid. The delusion caused by the presence of an external adjunct is sublated at the time of the impartite

does not include recollection and the *anupramāṇa-s*, and is therefore nonpervasive.

Some others, such as the Naiyāyika-s, define *pramāṇa* as 'the instrument of valid knowledge'. They

Nyāya view not
satisfactory

regard validity as the faithfulness with which knowledge depicts its objects.

Valid knowledge is that which informs us of the existence of something as it really is or of a character really possessed by it, or which predicates something. This definition does not include *kevala-pramāṇa* and has only partial application.

Udayana's general definition of *pramāṇa* as 'whatever is pervaded by valid knowledge' is overpervasive in respect of the objects of knowledge since all objects are pervaded by Īśvara's knowledge. To exclude the above-mentioned defect, he makes the definition more specific: 'whatever is pervaded by valid knowledge, while being a *sādhana* or *āśraya*'.¹ Even then, the inclusion of *āśraya* within the body of the definition does not serve any useful purpose. It may be said that it is included in order to secure the inclusion of Īśvara who is not a *sādhana* but still a *pramāṇa* according to the Nyāya school. This is also not very sound because

cognition. Though it is not sublated immediately, it is not unsublatable.

The deduction of Madhva that all cognitions would be invalid if judged by the test of nonsublation is acceptable to the Advaitin, because the only valid and absolute cognition for him is Brahman and the rest is relatively real.

¹ PP, p. 87.

the use of the word *pramāṇa* with respect to the agent, though not ungrammatical, is not sanctioned by usage.

The term *pramāṇa* in Indian epistemology, other than that of Madhva, is ambiguous. *Pramāṇa* is taken to mean 'the instruments' in some places and 'knowledge' in other places. Madhva's distinct contribution is the introduction of the two clear-cut terms, *kevala-pramāṇa*, and *anupramāṇa*, to mean 'knowledge' and 'instrument' respectively.

Enumeration of Pramāṇa-s

As has already been observed, Madhva broadly divides *pramāṇa-s* into *kevala* and *anu*. *Kevala-pramāṇa* or valid knowledge is of four kinds: *Īśvara-jñāna*, *Lakṣmī-jñāna*, *Yogi-jñāna*, and *Ayogi-jñāna*.¹

Īśvara-jñāna or the knowledge possessed by Īśvara is all-comprehensive and fully valid. It has neither beginning nor end, and is eternal. It is self-existent, self-valid, and is not different from His form (*svarūpa*). Īśvara's sense organs (*indriya-s*) have perpetual contact with all objects, and His cognition is relational (*saviṣaya*). In fact, there is no cognition that is nonrelational

Svarūpa-jñāna of
Īśvara

¹ PP, p. 94.

(*nirviṣaya*).¹ But this does not mean that cognition is dependent on objects, for Madhva asserts that cognition is not dependent upon objects (*viṣayādhīna*) but has only content (*saviṣaya*). If we examine the meaning of the term *adhīnatā* (dependence), this statement becomes clear. *Adhīnatā* is defined as 'that which causes origination' (*utpatti-prayojakatva*). Cognition cannot be said to be dependent upon objects as they do not cause the origination of cognition. We cannot say that wherever there is no object there is no cognition for we have cognition in the form of recollection of objects that are not existent. It is true that cognition should have an object for its content. But this is not dependence or limitation. If by 'dependence' the very presence of external objects (*saviṣayakatva*) is meant, then it is acceptable to Madhva. Īśvara has also cognition of objects that have not come into existence. According to Madhva, objects do not come from nonexistence into existence. Everything exists in either manifested or unmanifested form and Īśvara has cognition of both. This is the *svarūpa-jñāna* of Īśvara.

The points of difference between the *svarūpa-jñāna* of the Brahman of the Advaita and the Īśvara of the Dvaita are the following: Brahman's *svarūpa-jñāna* is the nonexistence of nescience (*ajñāna*) whereas that of Īśvara is a positive entity (*bhāvarūpa*); the former's cognition is

¹ Madhva, *Gītātātṭhāparyanirṇaya*, ed. T. R. Kṛṣṇācārya, Nirṇaya Sagar Press, 1905, fo. 133.

nonrelational (*nirviṣaya*) and the latter's relational (*saviṣaya*); Brahman's cognition is devoid of any attribute, but Īśvara's cognition has the attribute *jñānatva*.

Lakṣmī-jñāna also requires no effort of thought. This too has neither beginning nor end and is eternal.

Lakṣmī-jñāna But since it is dependent on Īśvara it is not so clear¹ and distinct as the cognition of Īśvara which is independent. It extends to all objects except Īśvara, with whom it is not coextensive. Not only Īśvara and Lakṣmī but all other souls also possess *svarūpa-jñāna* which is beginningless. But with regard to the latter, only a part of it manifests itself at a time.

The *svarūpa-jñāna* of Īśvara and Lakṣmī differs from the *svarūpa-jñāna* of all other souls in that the latter is limited by nescience. The *svarūpa-jñāna* of Īśvara and Lakṣmī is all-pervasive (*vibhu*) and not limited as that of other souls whose knowledge is obtained through the effort of thought. The *svarūpa-jñāna* of the ordinary soul does not comprehend all that pertains to the objects cognized. For example, while cognizing a pot, it does not comprehend its weight, its composition, its future and its past. On the other hand, Īśvara's *svarūpa-jñāna* cognizes everything that pertains to the object. Though the application of the same term *svarūpa-jñāna* to Īśvara's knowledge and the knowledge of other souls is not quite

¹ Clarity is a quality present in cognition and not in the object of knowledge.

satisfactory, the usage of the term is maintained, because both cognize an object. The cognition, however, differs in degree. The difference among the varying grades of *svārūpa-jñāna* is judged by the extent and the number of things it comprehends, its degree of dependence, clarity, and validity.

The *svārūpa-jñāna* of the soul is the efficient cause that directs its *manovṛtti-jñāna* or the knowledge which is in the form of the modifications of the mind (*manas*). Mind is the material cause of this. The soul establishes its contact with the mind, and the mind in its turn has contact with the senses, and they in turn have contact with objects. Thus cognition of objects results.

Nescience covers the real nature of all souls other than Īśvara and Lakṣmī. This nescience is positive in character (*bhāvarūpa*). It is inert, manifold, real, and beginningless.¹ Nescience by itself has not the power to conceal the nature of the soul because it is dependent on God's will. The veil over the real nature of the soul is fully removed only by the beatific vision of God, and His resolve to save us.² This vision of God comes through *manovṛtti-jñāna*. Īśvara's Grace alone is the unique cause (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*) for the removal of nescience.

There are points of agreement and difference between the Advaitin-s and the Dvaitin-s as regards nescience. Both schools admit that nescience is

¹ *Anuvyākhyāna*, SM, vol. I, fo. 159.

² *Ibid.*, fo. 160.

positive and manifold.¹ To Madhva nescience is real, whereas to the Advaitin it is unreal (*mithyā*). According to both the schools it is the soul's powers that are obscured by it. But there is difference among the Advaitin-s as to whether the individual soul or the Brahman is the locus of the nescience. According to Madhva, however, the soul alone is the locus. The removal of nescience is effected by knowledge alone according to the Advaitin-s and by the Grace of the Lord alone according to Madhva.²

Yogi-jñāna is that knowledge which is obtained by *yogin-s* through their yogic power as a result of their meditation on Īśvara. It is of three kinds: the knowledge of *ṛjuyogin-s*, of *tāttvikayogin-s*, and of *atāttvikayogin-s*.³

Ṛjuyogin-s are those who are capable of attaining the four-faced Brahmanhood.⁴ They have knowledge of all objects, which they attain only through the effort of thought. Their knowledge is twofold: *svarūpa-jñāna* and

¹ One school of Advaita, however, does not admit that it is manifold.

² Some later Advaitin-s have taken into account Īśvara's Grace as a potent factor in the removal of nescience. They go to the extent of saying that faith in non-dualism is gained by the Grace of the Lord. Śrīharṣa in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍa-khāḍya*, para 163, v. 25 says:

ईश्वरानुग्रहादेष्टा पुंसामद्वैतवासना ।
महामयकृतत्राणा द्वित्राणां यदि ज्ञायते ॥

³ PP, p. 97.

⁴ Madhva is considered to be a *ṛjuyogin* and there is a tradition to the effect that he is to be the creator (four-faced Brahman) in the next *kalpa*.

manovṛtti-jñāna. Their *svarūpa-jñāna* is beginningless, endless and unchanging, but revealed only in stages in proportion to the merit earned by them as a result of their meditation on Īśvara, and is completely made known only after the attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*). The *vṛtti-jñāna* of the *ṛjuyogin-s* is continuous and ever changing as a flowing river. Both these forms of knowledge are valid.

Tāttvikayogin-s are the deities who preside over and control the categories (*tattva-s*).¹ Their cognition, not merely with regard to Īśvara but to many other things besides, is incomplete. It is also of two kinds: *svarūpa-jñāna*, which is eternal and valid, and *vṛtti-jñāna*, which is partially invalid and partially valid.

The deities other than those that preside over the categories are called *atāttvikayogin-s*. Their knowledge

¹ The categories with their deities are:

	1. Puruṣa	Brahman and Vāyu
	2. Avyakta	Sarasvatī (consort of Brahman) and Bhārati (consort of Vāyu)
	3. Mahat	Brahman and Vāyu
	4. Ahaṁkāra	Garuḍa, Śeṣa and Rudra
	5. Manas	Skanda and Indra
Jñānen- driya-s	6. Śrotra	Digdeva-s
	7. Tvak	Prāṇa (son of Vāyu)
	8. Cakṣus	Sūrya
	9. Rasanā	Varuṇa
	10. Ghrāṇa	Aśvinideva-s
Karmen- driya-s	11. Vāk	Agni
	12. Pāṇi	Dakṣaprajāpati
	13. Pāda	Jayanta (son of Indra)
	14. Pāyu	Mitra (one of the 12 Āditya-s)
	15. Upastha	Manu (svāyambhuva)

has a beginning and their cognition of Isvara and other things is limited. It is also twofold, comprising *svārūpa-jñāna* and *ṛtti-jñāna*. The former is eternal, yet made known to them in proportion to the merit they have earned through their meditation on Isvara, while the latter is valid only occasionally.

All souls other than those mentioned above are *ayogin-s*, and their knowledge is invalid. Their knowledge not only of Isvara but of all things is entirely inadequate. The *svārūpa-jñāna* as well as the *ṛtti-jñāna* of *ayogin-s* has beginning and end.¹

Ayogin-s are of three types: *muktīyogya-s*, *nityasam-sārin-s*, and *tamoyogya-s*.² The *svārūpa-jñāna* of the first of these is valid, that of the second type is a composite of valid and invalid knowledge, and that of the third is invalid. The *ṛtti-jñāna* of all these three is occasionally invalid.

Indriya- viśaya-s	16. Śabda	Brhaspati
	17. Sparśa	Samāna
	18. Rūpa	Apāna
	19. Rasa	Vyāna
	20. Gandha	Udāna
Mahā- bhūta-s	21. Ākāśa	Ganapati
	22. Vāyu	Yāyu (son of Kaśyapa)
	23. Tejas	Agni
	24. Ap	Varuṇa
	25. Pṛthvī	Dharādevī

Madhva, *Tantrasārasaṃgraha*,

SM, vol. III, folios 754-5.

¹ PP, p. 111.

² See p. 3.

Madhva accepts three *anupramāṇa*-s or instruments of valid knowledge. They are perception, inference, and verbal testimony. The Cārvāka school accepts only one *pramāṇa*, namely, perception. The Buddhists and Vaiśeṣika-s accept two, perception and inference. The Sāṃkhya-s admit of three *pramāṇa*-s: perception, inference and verbal testimony. The Nyāya school adds analogy (*uṣamāna*) to these and accepts four *pramāṇa*-s. The Prābhākara-s include postulation (*arthāpatti*) as the fifth. The Bhāṭṭa-s and the Advaitin-s add a sixth, namely, noncognition (*anupalabdhi*). Madhva, however, contends that all the other *pramāṇa*-s of different schools can be brought under the three accepted by him.

According to the Cārvāka the only instrument of valid knowledge is perception. He rejects the validity of inference on the ground that there is not sufficient warrant for believing in the truth of the inductive relation or *vyāpti* which forms its basis. But this argument stultifies the Cārvāka's own position. His conclusion that 'inference is not valid' is itself the result of induction, and points to a conviction that in one case, at least, the relation of *vyāpti* holds true.

Verbal testimony has to be regarded as an independent *pramāṇa*. It cannot be brought under inference, as the Vaiśeṣika-s do, since valid verbal testimony depends on the meaning of words which cannot serve as the middle term in inferring their meanings.

Anupramāṇa-s
accepted by Madhva

Cārvāka view of
Inference untenable

Śabda an inde-
pendent Pramāṇa

The *Prābhākara-s* assert that only the *apauruṣeya* part of verbal testimony (the Veda-s which have no authorship) is an independent means of knowledge and not the *pauruṣeya* part (human composition) which leads to knowledge only through inference.¹ This view is not satisfactory because both the types have similar constituents and there is no basis for postulating such a distinction.

Analogy is not to be recognized as an independent *pramāṇa* since it can be shown as an instance of one or the other of the three *pramāṇa-s* mentioned above. Analogy is said to be that cognition for which knowledge of similarity is instrumental. A person learning that *gavaya* is similar to a cow goes to the forest and sees the animal *gavaya* and recollecting the information he has obtained arrives at the assimilative cognition 'this is the animal denoted by the word *gavaya*'. This is an instance of analogy. Cognitions like 'this is similar to that' and 'these two objects are similar' are the results of perception. The cognition 'the cow and the *gavaya* are similar' results from verbal testimony. On the strength of the perception of the similarity to the recollected object in the perceived, if we cognize the similarity to the perceived in the remembered, it is a case of inference. Thus there is nothing distinctive about the *pramāṇa* of analogy to justify its recognition as a distinct means of correct knowledge.²

¹ PP, p. 431.

² *Ibid.*, p. 437.

Those who recognize postulation (*arthāpatti*) as an independent instrument of knowledge hold that the function of this *pramāṇa* is to effect a *modus vivendi* between contradictories.

For example, if of a living person it be said that he is not at home, we conclude that he is out; but 'is' and 'is not' are contradictories which cannot subsist together; hence their discrimination and delimitation, nonexistence being restricted to the house and existence to all localities outside the house. This comes under inference, in the following form: 'Caitra is outside the house, because he is alive and not found at home; he who is alive and not found at a certain place must be at another place'.

Noncognition (*anupalabdhi*) is recognized by some as an independent *pramāṇa* which effects the knowledge of nonexistence. The cognition of nonexistence may take several forms, but they prove to be instances of one or the other of the three *pramāṇa*-s. The nonexistence of Kauravas, etc., at present is known through the *Mahābhārata*; this is verbal testimony. The nonexistence of sight in a person is known by seeing him incapable of perceiving colour, etc. This is a case of inference. The cognition of the nonexistence of happiness and such other facts is effected by the 'witness consciousness'. This is 'witness-perception' (*sākṣi-pratyaya*). The cognition of the nonexistence of the pot and such other things is an instance of sense perception.

Some others consider tradition (*aitihya*) also as an independent *pramāṇa*. If the authority claimed for tradition be well founded, its origin is to be known. Once it is known it becomes a case of verbal testimony. If the tradition is not well founded, it cannot lead to valid knowledge.

Tradition not a
separate *Pramāṇa*

III

ERROR, DOUBT AND DREAM

Error

THE soundness of any theory of knowledge can be judged by the way in which it treats the problem of error, the most knotty of all the problems of epistemology. Different schools of Indian philosophy have advanced different theories of error and their polemics against one another "exhibit their respective powers of psychological analysis and metaphysical acumen". Being a radical realist, Madhva sought to give a completely objective basis to the content of error after the model of the Nyāya school. With certain modifications he accepts the Nyāya theory of error, and calls it *abhinava-anyathākhyāti* (the novel theory of *anyathākhyāti*).

The Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā holds that there is no erroneous cognition as such. According to this school, that which is called a delusive cognition is made up of two elements, a perception and a recollection.¹ It is not a single unit of knowledge but a composite of two cognitions. When we perceive nacre as

Prābhākara theory
of error

¹ *Nyāyasūdhā*, fo. 43.

silver we perceive only the qualities common to nacre and silver, namely, brightness and the like. The qualities common to nacre and silver revive the idea of silver in our mind by association. What passes for error is the nondiscrimination of these two cognitions, namely, perception and recollection. One of these two cognitions, recollection, is mistaken for perception. It is this nonapprehension of difference (*bhedāgraha*) which is responsible for the empirical usage leading to such an appositional designation as 'nacre-silver' and the identification of the two in practice.

Madhva criticizes the Prābhākara position as follows: The assumption that what is called error is a composite of two cognitions has no warrant for it. When we discover error, we are not aware that there were two cognitions. The sublating cognition which takes only the form, 'What I took to be silver is not silver', goes to disprove the Prābhākara position.¹ Further, " 'do the two apprehensions, the perceived and the remembered ones, appear in consciousness or not? If they do not, they do not exist. . . . If they do, then nonperception of the difference between them is impossible'. The theory fails to account for the fact that, as long as error lasts, there is the actual presentation to consciousness and not a mere memory image. It is difficult to account for the obscuration of memory (*smṛti-pramoṣa*), which breeds the illusion of a direct presentation. . . . The knowledge of the given element, the shell, for which the person has no desire, will lead

¹ See *Ibid.*, folios 46-9.

to counter-activity, the knowledge of the remembered silver to activity, and the unconsciousness of the distinction between the two should result in non-activity. It is difficult to understand how unconsciousness can prompt one to activity.”¹

The Viśiṣṭādvaita theory of error is called *satkhyāti*. Its aim is to show that cognition, including delusion, never deviates from reality. If all knowledge be equally valid, it may be asked, how is the distinction between truth and error to be effected. The answer is that knowledge is always of the given, but need not be of the whole of what is given. Error is not incomplete knowledge, because it is not completeness of knowledge that differentiates truth from error. For knowledge to be true, it should, in addition to correspondence with external reality, be serviceable in life.² When mirage-water and shell-silver are described as false, what we understand is not that water and silver respectively are not present there, for in that case we could not become conscious of them at all, but they are not such as can be put to practical use. The sublating cognition does not negate the object (*artha*) but it negates activity (*pravṛtti*) on the part of the cognizer based on the cognition.³ The discovery of error, in Prabhākara's

¹ Gaṅgeśa's criticism; see *Indian Philosophy* by Sir. S. Radhakrishnan, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1927, vol. II, p. 398.

² *Yatīndramatadīpikā*, Anandashrama Sanskrit Series No.50, p. 3.

³ See *Śrutaprakāśikā* on *Śribhāṣya*, Nirmaya Sagar Press ed., p. 185.

view also, "affects only the reactive side of consciousness, not its receptive side".¹

Madhva's criticism of this theory is as follows: The assumption that all objects have the characteristics of all other objects in them has no warrant in our experience. If there be the element of 'silverness' in the nacre, the perception of the silver is no error at all. If it be contended that it is partial knowledge which constitutes error, then our knowledge of Brahman obtained through the Veda-s would become erroneous, because we have cognition of only a few attributes which form a fraction of the infinite attributes of Brahman. Further, when we perceive silver in the nacre, it is not the perception of a little quantity of silver in it. If it were so, it would be nothing but *anyathākhyāti*.²

The Yogācāra school of Buddhism holds the view that there are no external objects corresponding to the cognitions we have. An error is not produced by any external object in contact with a sense organ, but is the projection of a subjective idea into the world, i.e., a "subjective hallucination".³ The idea of silver is produced by the residual impression of the silver cognition. This is called *ātmakhyāti* or apprehension of the self as external.⁴

Yogācāra view
of Error

¹ Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1932, p. 395.

² *Nyāyasudhā*, fo. 49.

³ Sinha, *Indian Psychology: Perception*, Kegan Paul, London, 1934, p. 287.

⁴ For a full statement of the *ātmakhyāti*, see Vidyāranya's *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha*, trans. in *Indian Thought*, vol. I, pp. 271-3.

Madhva criticizes this view as follows: If everything be an idea, the cognition, the cognizer, and the cognized would become mere ideas. Then the cognition should have taken the form 'I am silver', and not 'this is silver'. Further, this view is open to all those objections which are levelled against the denial of an external world of reality. Besides this, to mistake the purely subjective idea for the objective silver is again a case of *anyathākhyāti*.¹

The Mādhyamika school of Buddhism doubts the validity of knowledge as a whole. The common belief

Mādhyamika view
of Error that we reach reality through knowledge is refuted by the Mādhyamika-s.

They say that what we call reality is riddled with all sorts of self-discrepancies and nothing can be said to be either existent or nonexistent. The illusory cognition of silver is invalid, not because something nonexistent is cognized as existent, but because that cognition is not useful in empirical life; for the distinction between valid and invalid cognition is based on how the cognition serves the empirical purpose. Madhva shows the untenability of this view.² The sublating cognition does not negate nacre, and so there is the reality of the nacre which is cognized through perception. The Mādhyamika position denies this, and so is opposed to experience. There is neither the possibility

¹ Madhva's criticism of the *ātmakhyāti* is the same as that of the Naiyāyika. Cf. Jha's "Sadholal Lectures on Nyāya", *Indian Thought*, vol. IV, p. 393.

² *Nyāyasudhā*, fo. 55.

nor the place for the concept of error in that school because nothing has existence. If nonexistence is mistaken for existence, it is again a case of *anyathākhyāti*.

Error, according to Advaita, is illegitimate transference or superimposition (*adhyāsa*). Defective sense

Advaita theory of
Error

organs and previous experience of the object of delusive cognition are not by themselves sufficient to produce erro-

neous perception. When nacre is cognized as silver, what happens is that over the real substratum (*adhi-ṣṭhāna*), i.e., nacre, or more correctly, nacre-delimited spirit (*śuktyavacchinna-caitanya*), the beginningless positive nescience (*anādi-bhāvarūpa-ajñāna*) causes the silver. The nescience here operates in a double way; it conceals the fact of nacre and brings silver to sight in its place. These two aspects of nescience are called *āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa* respectively. When the sense of sight comes into contact with the nacre, the nescience is partly dissolved by the modification of the internal faculty of knowing (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which takes the form 'this' (*idamākāra*). It, however, continues to veil the nacre-ness of what is seen as 'this' (*idam*). The two factors, namely, the prepossessions of the knower's mind and the similarity between the object seen as 'this' and silver, cause the *antaḥkaraṇa* to undergo a transformation with the result that silver too comes into existence along with the cognitive modification of nescience. Thus, according to the Advaitin-s, error is a cognitive complex of two factors: the *vr̥tti* or modification of *antaḥkaraṇa* and the *vr̥tti* of nescience.

The silver that has come into existence thus is neither real (*sat*) nor unreal (*asat*), nor both real and unreal (*sadasat*). It is not real, because the sublating cognition contradicts it; nor can it be unreal, because there is the immediate cognition of silver and the consequent effort on the part of the person under delusion to pick it up; nor can it be both real and unreal, because such a supposition would involve both the above difficulties, and reality and unreality cannot inhere in one. So it is said to be relatively real, and is said to be indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*). It is also said to be apparent (*prātibhāsika*) in the sense that it is co-terminal with its presentation in cognition.

The Advaitin-s favour the *anyathākhyāti* view with reference to delusions conditioned by an adjunct (*sopādhika-bhrama*), e.g., the cognition of a crystal as red when a red flower is in its vicinity.

Madhva criticizes the Advaita view¹ on the ground that the doctrine of *anirvacanīya* is unintelligible. A thing is either real or unreal; there can be no middle ground. The very assumption of the indeterminable existence of the delusive cognition implies that something appears to consciousness as real. This is only another version of the *anyathākhyāti* which the Advaitin seeks to refute. If the indeterminate silver were apprehended as indeterminate, the cognition would be no delusion at all; but it is not so, because it is

Refutation of the
Advaita view

¹ *Nyāyasudhā*, folios 55-7.

contradicted by the sublating cognition. Further, if we admit that an indeterminate object is produced at the time of the delusive cognition, what exactly is its cause? What is the indeterminable silver which is the object of delusion? The answer that a beginningless nescience is the cause of silver is not reasonable because it involves the fallacy of infinite regress or reciprocal dependence.

The Nyāya theory of error is known as *anyathākhyāti*, which means apprehension as other or different.

The Nyāya view
of Anyathākhyāti

According to the later Nyāya school, it is the apprehension of certain attributes of an object different from its true setting. Error, therefore, creeps in where we relate two or more objects present in our cognition. The contents of our knowledge as a complex may be false, but the several things we cognize are true. Error creeps in during the synthetic activity of the mind. In the example of the shell-silver when the shell is seen as silver the erroneous cognition that arises takes the form 'this is silver' (*idaṃ rajatam*). Here 'this' stands for the shell lying in front of the person, and it is first seen as a white piece and not as nacre, the distinctive feature of nacre being missed through some defect in sight. The visual perception of shell arises in the ordinary way, i.e., the normal sense relation of contact between the sense and the object seen. The 'silverness' which belongs to the real silver is elsewhere, for example, in the silver in a shop (*āpaṇastha-rajata*). This 'silverness' which is elsewhere is presented here as the attribute of the

shell seen as 'this' (*idam*). Neither the real silver nor the real 'silverness' is connected with the sense of sight through normal sense relation. But without some sense relation perception is unaccountable. So the Naiyāyika-s hold that the real silver and 'silverness' come to be connected with the sense of sight by an extra-normal sense relation (*alaukika-sannikarṣa*) called *jñānalakṣaṇā*, i.e., sense contact in the form of cognition. The Nyāya school maintains that in a delusive cognition not only the subject but also the predicative element is of an extra-normal (*alaukika*) type where the impressions of former experiences serve as a means of representing things to our mind. Thus even the content of error has a completely objective basis.

Madhva criticizes the *anyathākhyāti* view advocated by the Naiyāyika-s but accepts it with some modifications. Is the extra-normal relation conceived by the Nyāya school real or unreal? If it be real, the cognition of silver in the shell is not a case of delusion at all, since all the three elements of the cognition, the object, the attribute and the relation, are real. If it be unreal, the Naiyāyika has to accept the cognition of nonexistence (*asat*), a position fundamentally opposed to his realism. Thus showing the weak points in the Nyāya theory of error, Madhva propounds his own theory, the *abhinava-anyathākhyāti* (the novel theory of *anyathākhyāti*).

Madhva accepts that the nonexistent (*asat*) can be cognized and states that the apprehension of the

nonexistent as the existent and the existent as the nonexistent is error.¹ Absolute non-existence is only that nonexistence which is present in all three aspects of time.² This acceptance of cognition (*pratīti*) is refuted by all other schools.³ But Madhva tries to put forth a case for it. Those who deny the cognition of the nonexistent are in a way obliged to accept it. When the Advaitin or any other opponent declares that a particular object is not nonexistent such differentiation (*vilakṣaṇa-jñāna*) implies the cognition of the nonexistent, because without the cognition of the counter-correlate the cognition of nonexistence is not possible. To know that a particular thing is different from the nonexistent is to know the nonexistent. This fact can be put in the form of an inference: The disputants have cognition of the nonexistent because they have cognition of the difference from the nonexistent; he who has the knowledge of the difference of one object from another has the knowledge of the object from which the difference is cognized.⁴ Thus Madhva makes a statement in his *Anuvyākhyāna* to the effect that his position regarding the cognition of the nonexistent is irrefutable.⁵

¹ असतः सत्त्वप्रतीतिः सतोऽसत्त्वप्रतीतिरिति । *Nyāyasudhā*, fo. 47.

² See Jayatīrtha's comm. on Madhva's *Tattvasaṃkhyāna*, ed. Rāmācārya and Kṛṣṇācārya, Nirṇaya Sagar Press, fo. 3.

³ By the word *pratīti* the Advaitin-s mean only immediate cognition. They deny such cognition in the case of the nonexistent. They admit mediate cognition of it.

⁴ See also Chapter II, p. 15-16.

⁵ *Anuvyākhyāna*, SM, vol. I, fo. 159.

Doubt

Jayatīrtha defines doubt as 'uncertain knowledge' (*anavadhāraṇa-jñāna*). Doubt arises only when we fail to cognize the unique attribute (*asādhāraṇa-dharma*) characterizing the object cognized. Doubtful cognition (*saṁśaya-jñāna*) has for its content a single object (*ekavastu-viśayaka*) and two or more alternative attributes as characterizing the object (*anekakoṭi-prakāra*).

A certain school of the Naiyāyika-s enumerates five causes which give rise to doubt in the absence of the determining factor. They are:

Five causes of Doubt properties common to many objects (*sādhāraṇa-dharma*), unique characteristic (*asādhāraṇa-dharma*), conflicting testimony (*vipratipatti*), cognition (*upalabdhi*), and noncognition (*anupalabdhi*).

These can be illustrated as follows: In an act of cognition we notice an object in front of us characterized by the attribute 'tallness'. This is a common attribute (*sādhāraṇa-dharma*) in a restricted sense reminding us of two alternatives, a person or a tree stump, for in order to give rise to the cognition of these two alternatives, the attribute has to be present in both (*koṭidvaya-samānādhikaraṇa*). Thus, having cognized the attribute common to a person and a stump, we recall both to our mind and in the absence of the cognition of the determining factors characterizing each, namely, 'head and hands' and 'crookedness and cavities' respectively, the doubt as to whether it is a person or a stump arises.

He who has the knowledge that sound is the exclusive quality of *ākāśa* (ether), doubts whether sound is eternal or noneternal, in the absence of any decisive factor. Here the unique characteristic of sound being the property of *ākāśa* causes the doubt.

The disputes between the Vaiśeṣika-s and the Sāṃkhya-s regarding the nature of the senses causes one to doubt whether the senses are elemental or nonelemental, when no decisive factor is available. In this case conflicting testimony (*vipratipatti*) is the cause of doubt.

When a well is sunk and water appears, in the absence of any determining factor a doubt arises as to whether the water is revealed now by the act of digging, or whether it is brought into existence in a place where it was not present before. Here the cognition (*upalabdhi*) of water causes the doubt.

A person comes to learn that a demon dwells in a certain tree; he, however, sees no demon around. This fact of noncognition (*anupalabdhi*) in the absence of the determining factor gives rise to a doubt as to whether the demon is not seen due to his power to remain invisible or whether he does not inhabit the tree at all.

Later Naiyāyika-s say that there are only three causes that give rise to doubt since cognition (*upalabdhi*) and noncognition (*anupalabdhi*) can be included in *sādhāraṇa-dharma*.¹ We have cognition of existing objects like the pot and the cloth, in darkness, with the aid of a lamp.

Three causes of
Doubt

¹ PP, p. 55.

Similarly, we have cognition of formerly nonexistent things after their manufacture. Thus, cognition (*upalabdhī*) becomes a *sādhāraṇa-dharma* as it belongs to existent as well as nonexistent objects. In the same way we have noncognition (*anupalabdhī*) of existent objects like Īśvara and Time, and also of nonexistent objects like the horns of a hare, etc. As noncognition belongs to both existent and nonexistent objects it becomes a *sādhāraṇa-dharma*.

Jayatīrtha goes further and reduces the sources of doubt to a single head, namely, *sādhāraṇa-dharma*.¹

His point is that *asādhāraṇa-dharma* and *vipratipatti* can also be included in *sādhāraṇa-dharma*. Let us examine in detail the case of the unique characteristic (*asādhāraṇa-dharma*). It does not give rise to doubt directly like *sādhāraṇa-dharma*, because it has no capacity to remind us of two alternatives. It causes doubt through differentiation (*vyāvṛttimukhena*). The unique quality of *ākāśa* is not able to give rise to the cognition of two alternatives, because it is present only in *ākāśa*. At the same time it is found neither in eternal objects like Īśvara, Time or Space, nor in noneternal objects like the pot or cloth. Thus we come to cognize the two modes, namely, 'not being present in eternal things' and 'not being present in noneternal things'. Thus the cognition of the unique quality of *ākāśa* qualified by the two attributes gives rise to doubt. According

Sādhāraṇa-dharma
alone the cause

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

to Jayatīrtha this is a case of doubt arising as a result of two *sādhāraṇa-dharma-s*, namely, not being in eternal things (*nityāvṛttitva*) and not being in noneternal things (*anityāvṛttitva*).

In what sense are the two above-mentioned attributes *sādhāraṇa-dharma-s*? A *sādhāraṇa-dharma* is that attribute which is present in one alternative, and also in the subject of doubt. Interpretation of *Sādhāraṇa-dharma* Wherever doubt arises as a result of two *sādhāraṇa-dharma-s*, the attributes are present in one of the alternatives and the subject of doubt. *Sādhāraṇa* means to be common to more than one, and this plurality is made up in the case of the two *sādhāraṇa-dharma-s* by the subject of doubt on the one hand and one of the alternatives on the other. In the instance cited above, the *asādhāraṇa-dharma* of *nityāvṛttitva*, not being present in eternal objects, is present in the attributes of noneternal objects like the pot, and also in the subject of doubt which is sound. The *asādhāraṇa-dharma* of *anityāvṛttitva* is present in the attributes of eternal objects like Īśvara and Time and also in the subject of doubt. The cognition of the *asādhāraṇa-dharma* of *nityāvṛttitva* gives rise to one alternative, 'Is sound noneternal?'; that of *anityāvṛttitva* gives rise to the other alternative, 'Is sound eternal?' The two *asādhāraṇa-dharma-s* together, in the absence of a determining factor, give rise to the doubt, 'Is sound noneternal or eternal?'¹

¹ The *sādhāraṇa-dharma* in the Nyāya school is the attribute present in more than one alternative. Jayatīrtha's interpretation

Similarly, conflicting testimony (*vipratipatti*) can also be included in *sādhāraṇa-dharma*.¹ In the example already referred to, there are two *sādhāraṇa-dharma-s*: being an element and being a nonelement. The attribute 'being an element' is present in the subject of doubt, and in one of the alternatives, i.e., elemental objects like the pot. The attribute 'being a nonelement' is also present in the subject of doubt and in one of the alternatives, namely, nonelemental things like Īśvara and Time. These two *sādhāraṇa-dharma-s* in the absence of a determining factor, give rise to the doubt whether our senses are elemental or nonelemental.

The Naiyāyika-s accept other types of indefinite knowledge besides doubt, namely, surmise (*ūha*) and the knowledge where all the alternatives are unmanifested (*anadhyavasāya*). Jayatirtha brings them also within the fold of doubt (*saṁśaya*).

of the word *sādhāraṇa-dharma* is not strictly logical. Further, the mode of operation when the *sādhāraṇa-dharma* is present in both the alternatives is quite different from the mode of operation when the two *sādhāraṇa-dharma-s* function together. In one case a single attribute calls to cognition both the alternatives, and in the other case, each attribute calls to cognition one alternative only. Together they give rise to the cognition of both the alternatives.

¹ PP, p. 64.

Dream Cognition

There are some passages in the Upaniṣad-s which declare that our world of experience has the same validity as dream experience and dream cognition.¹ From this it follows that if dreams and dream objects prove to be unreal, our world of experience also proves to be unreal. One important tenet of Madhva's pluralistic metaphysics is the absolute and eternal reality of the world of facts. The position of dream cognition in the epistemology of Madhva is of importance as seen against the realistic background of his metaphysics. This fact causes Madhva to discuss the problem in detail and refute the views of other schools.²

The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school holds that dreams are a distinct type of cognition different from recollection, doubt, and indefinite knowledge. Udayana refuses to bring dream cognition under recollection on the ground that dream cognition does not take the form 'I remember', which it would have taken were it a recollection. Further, in dreams we have cognition of objects which we have never experienced before. This fact rules out the hypothesis that dream cognition is a type of recollection, because recollection is possible only of the experienced. Dream cognitions are determinate as we

¹ *Br. Up.* III. 4. 10; *Kāṭhaka* V. 8; *Aitareya* II. 3. 4. 17.

² Umesha Mishra, "Dream Theories in Indian Thought", *The Allahabad University Studies*, vol. V, pp. 273-280.

experience the fact of 'thisness' (*idamtvā*), which is a special characteristic of perception.¹ Nor can dream cognition be included in doubt; the mind in dream cognition does not oscillate between alternative possibilities, as in doubt. So dream cognition comes under perception.

According to the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Sāṃkhya-s, however, dreams are representative in their nature.

Mīmāṃsā theory of dreams Kumārila holds that dream cognitions are produced by the revival of past impressions lurking in the subconscious.

According to Pārthasārathi Miśra, this revival is effected through the agency of *adr̥ṣṭa* (literally, the invisible), the virtue or vice acquired by one's deeds, causing pleasure or pain. The experience of dream objects as existing here and now is accounted for by the perversion of the mind in sleep. Prabhākara explains that the memory element in dreams, i.e., the 'thatness', is forgotten, so the objects appear as a direct and immediate presentation. This is due to the obscuration of memory (*smṛti-pramoṣa*).²

Though the Advaitin-s accept the presentative nature of dream objects, they differ from the Naiyāyika-s regarding the metaphysical implications of dream objects and dream cognition.

Advaita theory of dreams There is no cognition for the Advaitin which does not involve a subject and an object. Where there is no object, there is no knowledge; there cannot be a cognition of the 'round square'

¹ Cf. *Indian Psychology: Perception*, pp. 310-11.

² Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 309.

and the 'barren woman's son' except a verbal one. In dream cognition also, we are forced to assume the existence of an objective counterpart as otherwise we shall be face to face with the contradiction of the well-tested fact that there is no cognition without an object. The Advaitin-s accept dream objects to be apparently real (*prātibhāsika*). The difference between the apparently real and the empirically real (*vyāvahārika*) consists not in the presence or absence of an object outside of and corresponding to the cognition but in the difference in character of the objects. The apparently real objects are common only to a few, while empirically real objects are common to most. Further, the former last only as long as their cognition lasts, while the latter are more enduring.¹

Madhva regards dream knowledge as valid, because it satisfies the criterion of validity, which is, according to him, strict correspondence with external reality (*yathāvasthita-jñeya-viṣayikāritva*). Dreams are not only valid but also real. The criteria that determine the reality of any object are its existence and nonsublation.² A thing need not be eternal to be real; unreal objects are those that are nonexistent at all times.

By 'existence' Madhva means existence in space and time.³ Space and Time exist in themselves. It

¹ *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 349-51.

² See p. 14.

³ All the arguments of the Advaitin against regarding the existent as the real are acceptable to Madhva also.

may be asked how a thing can have any relation with itself. Though according to the Advaitin's relation obtains only between two different relata, Madhva holds that relation obtains between two nondifferent things also.¹ He explains the relation on the basis of the category *viśeṣa*, as has already been observed.²

Another test of the reality of an object is its workability or utility (*arthakriyākāritva*). Mirage water is not real because it does not quench thirst. This is known as the pragmatic test. This test applies to delusive cognitions also.

On the strength of these criteria of validity and reality Madhva refutes the theory of the unreality of dream objects. The following are the main arguments put forth in support of the unreality of dream objects:

The Advaitin's objections

Dream objects are unreal because of the absence of the material and efficient causes without which nothing can come into existence. The spatial dimensions of our head are very limited, and so they cannot accommodate huge objects like the real elephant and real mountain which are presented in dreams. For real cognition the respective sense organs must be operating; in dream experience none of the senses functions. Dream cognition and dream objects are sublated by our waking experience.

Madhva answers these arguments as follows: The material cause of dream objects is the impressions

¹ *Anuśākhya*, SM, vol. I, fo. 195.

² See p. 9.

(*vāsanā-s*). The impressions of our experiences, even of the past lives, are deposited in the mind (*manas*), which exists till one attains liberation and maintains its threefold characteristic (*sattva-rajastamo-rūpa*). It is these impressions stored in the mind that serve as the material cause of dream objects. The efficient cause of dreams is God. The authority for this assumption is the *Vedānta-sūtra* III. 2. 1, which Madhva interprets as "God creates the objects of the dream state, Śruti says so." It is when they are destroyed by God that they come to an end.

As regards the discrepancy in the size of the brain and the objects of the dream state, and the absence of perceptual senses, it is said that dream objects being the direct creation of God do not require the exact data of common experience.

The Nyāya school contends that dream objects are unreal, because the material out of which they are made is not perceptible. Madhva considers the impressions out of which dream objects are made as supersensible like the atoms of the Naiyāyika-s. The atoms though themselves imperceptible are said to be the material cause of the binary (*dvyaṇuka*) and the triad (*tryaṇuka*); similarly the imperceptible impressions can also serve as the material cause of perceptible dream objects.

Another possible objection against regarding the impressions as the material cause of dream objects is that the impressions can be only of experienced objects.

In dreams we cognize even objects which have not been experienced by us in our waking life. This objection is answered by positing the view that the impressions are accumulated in the mind during past lives also.

Madhva criticizes the doctrine of the threefold reality (*sattā-traividhya*) of the Advaitin-s on the strength of which they ascribe apparent reality to dream objects.¹ His main argument is that any division presupposes an object that is capable of being divided (*vibhajanīya-vastu*) and possessing some generic attribute (*vibhājaka-dharma*) characterizing it. As the Advaitin does not accept any *sattā* other than the three (*pāramārthika*, *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsika*), there is no common attribute in all the three *sattā-s* that makes division possible. If it is contended that *pāramārthika-sattā* is the common attribute, the other two prove to be different; then they do not become divisions of *sattā*. Hence the division is vitiated. Further, at the time of cognition we do not cognize objects as characterized by any of the three *sattā-s*.

On the other hand, Madhva points out that perception and inference bear testimony to the reality of dream objects. We have a reflective cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) of dream experience. *Anuvyavasāya* is perception. As we have perception of dream objects, we cannot say that they are unreal. Inferences that prove the

¹ *Anuvyākhyāna*, SM, vol. I, fo. 159.

reality of dream objects can be put in the following form: (1) Dream objects are real because, like knowledge, they are originated by the mind. (2) Dream objects are real because, like Brahman, they are the *loci* of superimpositions. (3) Dream objects are real because, like the world, they are created by Īśvara. For Madhva, dream objects are real, and dream cognition is valid. The element of unreality in dream experience lies in comprehending dream objects as constituting objects of the external world. The elephant which is seen in a dream is not unreal as such, but the idea that the dream elephant and the elephant seen in the external world are the same is unreal. Thus, what is sublated in dream experience is one of the attributes of the object, namely, the superimposed externality (*āropita-bāhyatva*). What is sublated in a delusive cognition is, however, the substrate itself.

IV

PERCEPTION

ALL the schools of Indian philosophy accept that *pratyakṣa* (perception) is one of the chief instruments of knowledge. Inference and other instruments of knowledge depend on perception for their data, while perception is immediate and direct.

Madhva defines the instruments of perceptual cognition in two ways following the two definitions of 'instrument' put forth by the Naiyāyika-s. The ancient Nyāya school defines 'instrument' (*kāraṇa*) as a distinctive cause having a function (*vyāpāravad asādhāraṇam kāraṇam*). Accepting this, Madhva defines *pratyakṣa* as 'the defectless sense organ'.¹ The later Nyāya school defines 'instrument' as merely 'a distinctive cause' (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*). Following this, Madhva defines *pratyakṣa* as 'the contact of the defectless sense organ with a defectless object'.² It will be found that these two definitions of perception are not totally different from each other, the difference being one of emphasis.

The sense organs of perception are of two kinds: the witness consciousness (*sākṣin*) and the physical sense

¹ Madhva, *Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya*, SM, vol. I, fo. 259.

² Madhva, *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa*, SM, vol. I, fo. 232.

organs (*prākṛtendriya-s*). The witness consciousness cognizes the pure existence of the
 Two kinds of Sense
 Organs *ātman*, its attributes, its nescience,
 mind and its modifications, pleasure
 and pain, time and space, etc.¹ The physical sense
 organs, six in number, are the organs of smell, taste,
 sight, hearing, touch and the mind (*manas*). All kinds of
 odours are the object of the organ of smell. The sense
 organ of taste tastes all the six *rasa-s*. The senses of
 touch and sight cognize objects that have size and
 colour, some qualities, actions and their universals
 (*jāti*). The sense of touch also feels the air about us.
 The sense of hearing has sound for its object. The
 mind cognizes all the objects through the instrumen-
 tality of the outer senses. Its independent function is
 in recollection.

The defects of the senses are enumerated by
 Jayatīrtha as noncontact of the organs with the mind,
 Defects of Sense
 Organs and affections of the sense organs such
 as jaundice and cataract (*kāca*). The
 defects of the mind are attachment,
 hatred, etc. He also specifies the defects of the objects.
 They are, being too distant or too near, being obstructed
 and being indistinguishably mixed with similar things.²

¹ PP, p. 126.

² There is a similar list of defects in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* of
 Īśvarakṛṣṇa:

अतिदूरात् सामीप्यादिन्द्रियधातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।
 सौक्ष्म्याद्व्यवधानादभिभवात् समानाभिहराच्च ॥

(Madras University ed., p. 25)

These defects prevent us from knowing the objects and distort our knowledge of them.¹

Like any cognition, perception is also of four kinds: *Īśvara-pratyakṣa*, *Lakṣmī-pratyakṣa*, *Yogi-pratyakṣa*, and *Ayogi-pratyakṣa*. The first two types of perception are the senses that are of the very nature of *Īśvara* and *Lakṣmī* respectively (*svarūpendriyātmaka*). In the case of the other two, the instrument of perception is partly the senses which are of their very nature (*svarūpendriya-s*) and partly the sense organs. The objects of these various types of perception are the same as those of the respective cognitions.²

The external sense organs are of three kinds: divine (*daiva*), daemonic (*āśura*), and intermediate (*madhyama*). The cognition by the divine senses is mostly valid, by the daemonic senses mostly invalid and by the third type partly valid and partly invalid.³

Among the *Ayogin-s*, the *svarūpendriya* of the *Muktiyogya-s* also cognizes correctly the object as well as its adjunctive attributes. The *svarūpendriya* of *Nitya-saṃsārin-s* and *Tamoyogya-s* cognizes correctly the form alone of an object. Their cognition of the adjunctive attributes is sometimes wholly erroneous and sometimes partly valid and partly invalid.

The Nyāya school enumerates six types of sense relations (*sannikarṣa*) that cause perceptual cognition.

¹ PP, p. 124.

² *Ibid.*, p. 142.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

They are contact (*saṃyoga*), inherence in what has come into contact (*saṃyukta-samavāya*),
 Nyāya enumeration of sense relations inherence in what is inherent in a thing which has come into contact (*saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*), inherence (*samavāya*), inherence in an inherent thing (*samaveta-samavāya*), and adjunct-substantive relation (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*).

The relation of the sense of touch and sight with objects like the pot, and that of the mind with Ātman are examples of contact. The senses of touch, sight, and mind have the relation of *saṃyukta-samavāya* when they perceive the qualities, movements, and universals of objects. The relation between the respective senses and the universals abiding in the Qualities and Actions of Substances is *saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya*. The relation of the sense of hearing with sound is an example of *samavāya* and that of the same with the universal 'soundness' (*śabdātva*) is one of *samaveta-samavāya*. In perceiving the category of inherence (*samavāya*) and nonexistence (*abhāva*) the relation between these and the respective senses is *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*.

Further the Nyāya school divides perception into two kinds, the indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and the determinate (*savikalpaka*). *Nirvikalpaka* presents merely the form of the object and no details about it. In *savikalpaka* some details of the object are also presented. Though indeterminate perception cannot as such be shown to be experienced, it is proved to exist as a necessary presupposition of our determinate knowledge of

Nyāya division
of Perception

objects. For the Nyāya school holds that 'the cognition of the qualifying attribute is the cause of the cognition of the qualified substantive' (*viśiṣṭajñānam prati viśeṣajñānam kāraṇam*). Determination of an object takes eight forms: substance, quality, action, the universal, particularity, inherence, nonexistence and name.¹

According to Madhva's epistemology every perception is determinate as perception is 'the concrete apprehension of an object with all its determinations'. Madhva refutes the indeterminate perception as well as the view that there are six types of sense relation. There is nothing to prevent the sense organ from cognizing the object as well as its attributes at the first contact. So there is no necessity for postulating an indeterminate stage in perception. In the perception of a substance with its attributes the cognition is only one, and it is needless to postulate two sense relations, one with regard to the substance and the other with regard to its attributes. The category of Inherence of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, and Particularity, as defined by them are not accepted by Madhva. There remains then only one type of sense relation, *samyoga*.

Madhva theory of
Perception

¹ PP, p. 151.

V

INFERENCE

ANUMĀNA (inference) etymologically means 'secondary proof'. The data for inference are derived from perception and verbal testimony. The whole of the dialectics of Indian philosophy is based on inference and no other instrument of knowledge has been more elaborately discussed in Indian epistemology.

The acceptance of inference as a means of valid knowledge has been criticized on the ground that it has no specific function to discharge, for the cognition of the pervasion, which is the essential cause of inference, includes the knowledge of the thing to be inferred. Thus the thing to be inferred is known prior to the inferential activity. Hence the futility of inference.

Criticism against
Inference

Jayatirtha and his commentator Janārdana refute this criticism saying that pervasion gives the relation between the probans and the probandum only in a general way; for example, the cognition of the pervasion of smoke by fire does not specify the exact place where the pervasion is present, which inference does. Inference helps us to establish the probandum in a certain place. Hence it has a specific purpose to serve and is not futile.¹

¹ PP, p. 180.

Jayatīrtha defines *anumāna* as 'defectless probans'.¹ It results from the cognition of pervasion and of the presence of the probans in a place, time, etc., appropriate to the mode of pervasion. Knowledge of pervasion (*vyāpti*) and of the presence of the probans in the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*) are necessary for inference. This is accepted by the Nyāya school also, according to Jayatīrtha. But his definitions of these two terms differ from those of the Nyāya school.

The ancient Naiyāyika-s defined *vyāpti* as *sādhya-bhāvaavad-avṛttitva*, i.e., the nonexistence of the probandum in every place where the probans does not exist; for instance, smoke is nonexistent in the lake where fire is also nonexistent. So there is pervasion of smoke by fire.

Besides the fact that this definition of *vyāpti* is negative in character the later Nyāya school found it inadequate with regard to certain valid inferences. In the inference that a certain quality (*guṇa*) has existence (*sattā*) because it has the generic attribute of *guṇatva*, the nonexistence of the probandum, which is *sattā*, is inconceivable anywhere for it is all-pervasive. So the later Naiyāyika-s modified the definition of *vyāpti* as 'the existence of the probandum and the probans in the same locus'.

Although this definition is positive in character and holds good in the instance cited above, Jayatīrtha

¹ PP, p. 157.

objects to it on the ground that it is still inapplicable to certain valid types of inference, for example, 'There is the flight of a bird in the sky because there is its shadow below'. This is a valid inference. Here as the probandum, 'the flight of the bird', is in the sky and the probans, 'shadow', down on the earth, they are not in the same locus. So Jayatīrtha redefines *vyāpti* as 'the relation between the probandum and the probans'. The probandum (characterized by a particular space and time) cannot be known without the probans (characterized by a particular space and time).¹

Pakṣadharmatā is defined by the Nyāya school as 'the presence of the probans in the subject' (*pakṣa-vṛttitva*). This definition is nonpervasive with reference to certain valid inferences; for example, in the inference 'In the uplands there is rain because there is a flow of water in the river of the lowlands', 'uplands' is the subject (*pakṣa*) and the probans 'the flow of water in the river of the lowlands' is not present in the subject. So Jayatīrtha defines *pakṣadharmatā* as 'the presence of

¹ The Nyāya definition of *vyāpti* is not interpreted by others in as restricted a sense as Madhva does. The unity in inference is a logical unity. All suitable places are to be considered as the subject (*pakṣa*). The presence of the probans and the probandum in the same locus is not to be literally understood for there is no case in which the probandum and the probans are absolutely in the same locus. Even in the well-known inference of fire from smoke, smoke is found above the surface of the mountain and fire is found on the surface.

the probans in an appropriate place' which is sometimes the subject and at other times other than the subject.

The capacity of things to have mutual relation or not depends on their nature, which is fourfold.

Fourfold nature
of things Some have reciprocal pervasion, for example, acts prohibited by the Veda-s

are sins and sins are those things which are prohibited by the Veda-s. Some others do not have reciprocal pervasion as in the case of smoke and fire. Wherever there is smoke there is fire but there may not be smoke wherever there is fire. Here, one of the relata, fire, has a wider range of existence compared with the other, smoke. Some are never found together, for instance, horseness (*aśvatva*) and cowness (*gotva*). There can be no pervasion between these attributes as there is no relation between them. There are certain attributes which are found sometimes with one object and at other times with another, for instance, the attributes 'capacity to cook' (*pācakatva*) and 'being a male' (*puruṣatva*). The capacity to cook is found in men as well as in women. There are also men who have no capacity to cook. There cannot, therefore, be any pervasion between these two attributes.¹

The modes of pervasion are ninefold: the pervasion which exists between two relata that are simultaneously in the same place, as the pervasion of taste by colour; the pervasion between two relata

¹ PP, p. 177.

in the same locus but at different times, as in the case of the pervasion of smoke by fire; the pervasion between two relata which exist simultaneously in different *loci*, as the pervasion of the rise of the star Kṛttikā by the imminent rise of the Rohiṇī star; the pervasion between two relata which exist at different times in different places, as the pervasion of the flood in a river in the lowlands by rain in the uplands; the pervasion of one relatum which is occasional by another which is permanent, though both exist in the same place, for instance, the pervasion of gravity by weight; the pervasion of the permanent relatum by the occasional though both exist in the same locus, for instance, the pervasion of the body by death; the pervasion of that which is present in a smaller area by another present in a wider area, as the pervasion of the relationship of contact by the attribute of being a substance; the reverse of the previous mode as in the pervasion of colour by the relationship of contact; the pervasion that exists between two relata which are limbs of one object, as the pervasion between the rise and fall of the two pans in a balance.

Pervasion by its mere existence cannot lead us to inference; only cognition of it can do that. The cognition of the probans and of the mode of pervasion is essential for inference.

All the three instruments of knowledge (perception, inference and verbal testimony) give rise to the cognition of *vyāpti*. The pervasion of smoke by fire

is perceptual. An individual sees smoke and fire together in a kitchen and begins to deliberate as follows: 'Are smoke and fire together only in the kitchen or do they exist together in all places at all times? Does either of them exist without the other?' He repeatedly observes that wherever there is smoke there is fire. He also observes the nonexistence of fire always accompanied by the nonexistence of smoke and in certain places, the existence of fire without smoke. The investigator then questions as follows: 'Is there any adjunct that is responsible for the presence of fire where there is smoke? It cannot be an uncaused relation.' Then he examines the kitchen to find the attributes that pervade both fire and smoke. The attribute 'knowability' is common to fire and smoke. This cannot affect the relation of smoke to fire. There are certain other attributes that are absent from both, for instance, the attribute of 'being a kitchen' (*mahānasatva*). This too cannot affect the relation of smoke to fire. Some other attributes are always found with smoke but not with fire such as contact with wet fuel. This attribute shows fire as separate from smoke but not smoke as separate from fire because the contact with wet fuel is not as pervasive as fire. If the investigator were to adduce the nonexistence of fire where there is smoke, he would need to find an adjunct which pervades fire but not smoke. Such an adjunct is not found because it does not exist. So he comes to the definite conclusion that there is no external adjunct which

Apprehension of
Vyāpti

can prove the nonexistence of fire where there is smoke.

The relation of smoke with fire is conditioned by an adjunct (*upādhi*), wet fuel. The contact of wet fuel with fire is coextensive with the presence of smoke, but is not coextensive with fire. The contact between wet fuel and fire causes smoke.

The cognition of the relation between smoke and fire is perceptual, and it is determined by three factors: repeated observation of the coexistence of smoke and fire, the noncognition of the absence of fire where there is smoke, and the certain knowledge of the nonexistence of any external adjunct. After certain cognition of the pervasion of the cognized smoke by fire, the existence of fire wherever there is smoke can be inferred.¹

The Nyāya school accepts two types of pervasion, positive pervasion (*anvaya-vyāpti*) which is the pervasion of the probans by the probandum, and negative pervasion (*vyatireka-vyāpti*), the pervasion of the absence of the probandum by the absence of the probans.

An example of positive pervasion is 'What is knowable is nameable, like the pot'. There is no negative form for the above inference, namely, 'That which is not nameable is not knowable'. Everything is nameable, so there cannot be an example of the unnameable.

¹ PP, p. 186.

The negative pervasion is pervasive of the subject term and has no positive instance. In the inference, 'All living bodies have souls because they have life, unlike the pot', the pervasion is as follows: Wherever there is the nonexistence of soul, there is the nonexistence of life as in the pot. There is no positive pervasion (*anvaya-vyāpti*) for the above inference, because all living bodies are taken as constituting the subject term. Such a subject term includes all beings with souls.

There are also inferences which admit of both types of pervasions, e.g., the well-known inference of fire from smoke. The positive pervasion is 'Wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen', and the negative pervasion is 'Wherever there is no fire there is no smoke, as in the lake'.

Jayatīrtha is of the opinion that there is no need for the negative pervasion; he admits only the positive pervasion.¹ The inferences where negative pervasion is made use of can also be proved on the basis of positive pervasion. The pervasion between two negatives cannot serve an inference in which something positive is established by some other positive. The Nyāya school establishes the validity of the negative pervasion through a series of links. The example cited above for the negative pervasion can be established by a positive pervasion; for instance, the pervasion can be in the following form: 'Wherever there is life there is

Negative Pervasion
unnecessary

¹ PP, p. 226.

soul'. If the place where we point out the pervasion cannot be known by perception, then we establish the pervasion by an inference which takes the following form: 'Being alive is pervaded by having a soul because the former is the countercorrelate of the non-existence which pervades the nonexistence of the latter'. The pervasion is as follows: That which is the counter-correlate of the nonexistence that pervades the non-existence of a thing (the probandum) is pervaded by that thing (probandum).

Jayatirtha classifies inference in three different ways. The first classification divides inference into three types. They are the inference of cause from effect (*kāryānumāna*), e.g., fire from smoke; the inference of effect from cause (*kāraṇānumāna*), e.g., rain from dense clouds; the inference of one thing from another, the two things not having a relation of cause and effect (*akārya-kāraṇānumāna*), e.g., the inference of colour from taste, as in the case of a mango, where the yellow colour of a ripe fruit may be inferred from its sweetness.

According to the second classification, there are two types of inference. They are the inference of perceptible objects (*dr̥ṣṭānumāna*), e.g., fire from smoke and the inference of nonperceptible objects (*sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭānumāna*), e.g., the inference of the existence of the sense organ of sight from the visual perception of colour, etc.¹

The third classification also comprises two types: the inference that helps us to prove our argument

¹ PP, p. 199.

(*sādhānānumāna*), e.g., the establishment of the cognition of fire from the cognition of smoke, and the inference that helps us to refute an argument (*dūṣaṇānumāna*). The latter is twofold: the inference that helps us to cognize the defects in the arguments (of the opponent) and the hypothetical argument (*tārka*).¹

Hypothetical argument is used as an auxiliary to valid inference. When stating a particular inference,

if the opponent argues that the probans used in the inference is ineffective in establishing the probandum, the hypo-

thetical argument is used to establish the pervasion; for example, with reference to the familiar inference of fire from smoke, the opponent argues that the probans 'smoke' exists but it does not prove the probandum 'fire'. Such a doubt is called *aprayojaka-śaṅkā*. It takes the following form: 'Let there be smoke (probans), there need be no fire (probandum)'. The hypothetical argument is used to refute this statement and takes the following form: 'If there were no fire, then there could be no smoke'. The hypothetical argument takes up the deduction of the opponent, namely, the nonexistence of fire, and from it deduces the nonexistence of smoke which is unacceptable to the opponent.

The hypothetical syllogism has five characteristics:²

1. There should be pervasion of the deducer (*āpādaka*) by the deduced (*āpādya*). In the above hypothetical argument, the nonexistence of fire is the

¹ PP, p. 203.

² PP, p. 205.

deducer and the nonexistence of smoke is deduced. The nonexistence of fire is pervaded by the non-
 Characteristics of existence of smoke. In a hypotheti-
 hypothetical cal argument, the pervasion of the
 syllogism deducer by the deduced must be a
 settled factor. If it were not so the doubt about the
 ineffectiveness of the probans to prove the pro-
 bandum would rise again. It is only to answer such a
 charge that the hypothetical argument is stated, and
 hence the necessity for the established nature of the
 pervasion.

2. It should not be liable to refutation by any
 counter hypothetical argument.

3. The deduced must be unacceptable to the
 opponent, for instance, the nonexistence of smoke is not
 acceptable to the opponent because he perceives smoke.

4. The hypothetical argument must culminate in
 the contrary of the opponent's argument against which
 this argument is directed (*viparyaya-paryavasāna*), for
 instance, 'there is smoke, so there is fire'. Without
 this the hypothetical argument is not complete.

5. The argument must not be of help to the
 opponent.

The third characteristic of the hypothetical argu-
 ment, i.e., 'deducing the unacceptable' is of two kinds:
 'abandoning the valid' and 'assuming the invalid'.¹
 Both these can be of three kinds as validity and invalid-
 ity may be perceived, inferred, or known through verbal
 testimony.

¹ PP, p. 205.

The deduction of the unacceptable is again five-fold: (1) Self-dependence, when we say that a particular object is created by its own self, e.g., A gives rise to its own self. (2) Reciprocal dependence, where we say that A is the cause of B, and B is the cause of A. (3) Arguing in a circle, when we say A is established by B, B by C, and C by A. (4) Infinite regress. when we have an unsettled, unestablished cause, e.g., A is caused by B, B by C, C by D and so on. (5) The occasioning of the unacceptable which cannot be included in the above-mentioned.

Hypothetical argument is valid, according to Jayatīrtha, and it is treated as a type of inference in Madhva's epistemology. The Nyāya school brings it under invalid knowledge but still regards it as aiding valid inference.

Inference is further divided into two kinds: inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) and inference for others (*parārthānumāna*).¹

When one cognizes the probans in a subject and recalls the pervasion of the probans and the probandum and makes an inference, it is an instance of inference for oneself.

Inference for others is put in the form of a syllogism. According to the Nyāya school, the syllogism has five members: the thesis set down in the proposition (*pratijñā*), e.g., 'this mountain has fire'; the probans (*hetu*), i.e., the sentence that states the probans

¹ PP, p. 230.

and ends in the ablative suffix, e.g., 'because it has smoke' (*dhūmāt*); the example (*udāharāṇa*), which is sometimes positive and sometimes negative, e.g., in the familiar inference of fire from smoke, the kitchen and the lake, respectively; subsumptive correlation (*ūpanaya*), which specifically makes known that the probans, which is made out to be invariably concomitant with the probandum, is present in the subject, e.g., 'as in the kitchen, there is smoke in this mountain'; the restatement of the thesis (*pratijñā*) in the form of a conclusion (*nigamana*), e.g., 'therefore the mountain has fire'.

Members of a
syllogism

The Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā recognizes only three members: *pratijñā*, *hetu* and *udāharāṇa*, or *udāharāṇa*, *ūpanaya*, and *nigamana*. The Buddhists accept only two: *udāharāṇa* and *ūpanaya*.

Madhva finds no meaning in specifying the number of members that should form a syllogism. The syllogism is used to convince others and make them understand our argument. If the inference is understood by the mere statement of the probans, the other members are then unnecessary.

VI

DEFECTS OF INFERENCE

*Defects with special reference to the
vulnerable points in a debate*

INFERENCE is defined as 'defectless probans'. What are the defects of the probans? They are those factors which prevent us from having the knowledge intended to be conveyed by the inference, and sometimes cause uncertain and erroneous cognition. They can be divided broadly into defects relating to meaning and defects relating to speech. The two defects relating to meaning are *virodha*, contradiction or the absence of the capacity to coexist; and *asaṅgati*, incongruity or the absence of expectancy. The two defects of speech are *nyūna*, omitting a part of the essential; and *adhika*, stating that which is not necessary to satisfy expectancy.

Each of these types of defects is of two kinds: those that are common to the parts of a debate—discussion, question, establishment of one's own position, and refutation of the opponent—and those that pertain to the inference itself.

There can be three kinds of contradiction in an inference: contradiction of proposition (*pratijñā-virodha*),

contradiction of probans (*hetu-virodha*) and contradiction of example (*dṛṣṭānta-virodha*).

Contradiction of proposition is twofold: contradiction of what is settled by valid knowledge (*pramāṇa-virodha*) and contradiction of one's own words (*svavacana-virodha*).

Pramāṇa-virodha is also of two kinds: contradiction of some stronger *pramāṇa* (*prabala-pramāṇa-virodha*) and contradiction of an equally strong *pramāṇa* (*samabala-pramāṇa-virodha*). The strength of a *pramāṇa* depends either on the numerical strength or the natural strength (that which is the source of subsistence for others and is incapable of being construed as having some other purport). Each of these *pramāṇa-virodha-s* can be divided into three kinds according to whether there is contradiction of perception, inference or verbal testimony. *Samabala-pramāṇa-virodha* can be either contradiction by the same inference or contradiction by another inference.¹

Svavacana-virodha can be of two kinds: accepting a conclusion conflicting with the doctrine of one's own school (*apasiddhānta*) and futile objection (*jāti*) which again is of three kinds: the contradiction between the words or clauses in a sentence uttered by oneself (*svavākya-virodha*), contradiction in one's own action (*svakriyā-virodha*), and contradiction of one's own principles (*svanyāya-virodha*).

Contradiction of probans can be either by the nonestablishment (*asiddhi*) of the probans or by nonpervasion (*avyāpti*).

¹ PP, p. 250.

Contradiction of example is of two kinds: defect in the probandum and defect in the probans.

The other three defects, *asaṅgati*, *nyūna* and *adhika*, are similarly divided into three kinds based on *pratijñā*, *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta*. In addition to these four defects, Jayatīrtha mentions two more: the acceptance of a disputed fact (*saṃvāda*), and the nonutterance of certain words which ought to be uttered in order to make the meaning intelligible to others (*anukti*). All the twenty-two vulnerable points (*nigraha-sthāna-s*)¹ put forward by the Nyāya school can be classified under these six defects (*virodha*, *asaṅgati*, *nyūna*, *adhika*, *saṃvāda* and *anukti*) as follows:²

1. PRATIJÑĀHĀNI is the giving up of what has been stated as the probandum. When one of the disputants declares that the mountain has fire because it is an object of cognition, and the opponent points out that the probans is inconclusive, if the former replies, 'Let the mountain have no fire', this becomes a vulnerable point. This can be included in *saṃvāda*.

2. PRATIJÑĀNTARA is the qualifying of the statement by adding adjectives to that which is already stated. On hearing the statement 'sound is noneternal', when the opponent points out that inarticulate sound is

¹ In a debate, when the protagonist with unchecked pride checks the pride of the opponent, it is called defeat (*nigraha*). The causes of such defeat are called vulnerable points (*nigraha-sthāna-s*). By the expression 'checking the pride' is meant the breaking of the opponent's resolve to establish his own position and refute that of the others.

² PP, pp. 265-370.

accepted to be noneternal and there is no necessity for proving it, the person who made the first statement adds 'articulate' (*varṇātmaka*) to the subject and thereby effects a change in his original thesis. Here the question arises, 'Is the previous debate continued, or is it a fresh debate?' It cannot be the continuation of the previous debate; once a point is proved or the defect in the opponent's argument pointed out, the debate comes to a close. It is useless to add any words after the end of the debate. If it is the beginning of a fresh debate there is no addition to the previous statement. Thus *pratijñāntara* proves not to be a vulnerable point at all.

3. PRATIJÑĀVIRODHA is the self-contradiction in the words or sentences of an individual, e.g., 'My mother is barren'. This is included in *svavacana-virodha*.

4. PRATIJÑĀSAMNYĀSA is denial of one's own words. On hearing the statement 'Fire is not hot', if it is pointed out that the statement is opposed to perception, the proponent says, 'I did not say that fire is not hot'. This is included in *pramāṇa-virodha*.

5. HETVANTARA is modifying the probans which was first stated without any qualification. 'Sound is noneternal because it is cognized by the senses.' When such an inference is stated the critic points out that the *hetu* is defective with regard to the Universal which though cognized by the senses is accepted to be eternal, and the proponent then qualifies his statement by adding the words, 'while possessing a universal'. This defect, like *pratijñāntara*, is dismissed on the ground that it is not a vulnerable point at all.

6. ARTHĀNTARA is making an additional statement not useful in the context but having a syntactical relation, e.g., 'Sound is noneternal, the cause (*hetu*) being that it is an object of cognition. The term *hetu* is derived from the root *hin* and has the suffix *tun*'. This is included in *asaṅgati*.

7. NIRARTHAKA is the use of meaningless words, e.g., 'Sound is eternal because *ka, ca, ta, ta, pa* is *ja, ba, ga, ḍa, da*'. This is included in *anukti* because a proper reason is not given.

8. AVIJÑĀTĀRTHA is the use of obscure words the meaning of which is not understood by the assembly and the opponents even when the statement is repeated, e.g., 'This which is the cause of supporting the daughter of Kaśyapa is conjoined with that which has the same name as the vehicle of the son of the three-eyed, because it possesses the latter's flag'. The above inference, when stated in ordinary, intelligible terms is 'The mountain has fire because it has smoke'. This is included under *anukti*.

9. APĀRTHAKA is the use of words which have individual meanings but are not syntactically related, e.g., 'sacrificial hearth, sheepskin, ten pomegranates, six cakes'. This comes under *asaṅgati*.

10. APRĀPTAKĀLA is the reversal of the accepted order of the members of a syllogism, e.g., 'Because it is made, sound is noneternal'. This is not a vulnerable point; there are instances of such valid usages as in the case, 'Because it generates fruitful activity, *pramāṇa* serves a purpose'.

11. NYŪNA is omission of one of the essential factors in a statement, e.g., 'The mountain has fire, like the kitchen'. Here the statement of the probans is omitted.

12. ADHIKA is the use of words which have syntactical relation, are not repetitive and are not entirely irrelevant, but serve a purpose already achieved by other words in the statement, e.g., 'The mountain has fire because it has smoke and also because it has luminosity'.

13. PUNARUKTA is repeating one's own words without any purpose even after the meaning has been understood, e.g., 'The mountain has fire, the mountain has fire'. This is included in *adhika*.

14. ANANUBHĀṢAṆA is the case where, though the proponent's statement is understood by the judges and is restated by the proponent or the assembly, the opponent fails to restate and reply to the statement, but hides his ignorance without breaking the debate. It is of five kinds: arguments like 'What the disputant said is this', restating the defective part in the statement, stating only the defects, misstating the case, and silence. The first three are included under *nyūna*, the fourth under *asaṅgati* and the fifth under *anukti*.

15. AJÑĀNA is nonapprehension of the meaning of a statement which has been repeated by the disputants, and the meaning of which is understood by the assembly. This is included in *anukti*.

16. APRATIBHĀ is not knowing the reply to the question asked by the disputant. This is included in *anukti*.

17. VIKṢEPA is stopping the debate by making some excuse. This is included in *anukti*.

18. MATĀNUJÑĀ is deducing that which is acceptable to the opponent, e.g., 'You are a thief because you are a man'. This proves that the speaker, himself being a man, admits to being a thief. This comes under *asaṅgati*.

19. PARYANUYOJYOPEKṢAṆA is failure to point out the vulnerable point when it should be pointed out. This comes under *anukti*.

20. NIRANUYOJYĀNUYOGA is asserting the presence of a particular vulnerable point which has not arisen. It is of four kinds: *chala*, *jāti*, *hānyādyābhāsa*, and *aprāptakāle grahaṇa*.

Defeating the opponent's point in a debate by interpreting the words used by him in a sense other than the one intended by him is called *chala*, e.g., when one uses the word *gau* to mean a cow and the other interprets it as 'earth'. This is a case of *asaṅgati*.

Jāti is quibbling. The different types of *jāti* enumerated by the Nyāya school are treated in detail by Jayatīrtha.¹

Hānyādyābhāsa is seeming *Pratijñāhāni*, etc. It is included in *pramāṇa-virodha*.

Aprāptakāle-graṇa is the raising of a vulnerable point at a wrong time. It is included in *asaṅgati*.

21. APASIDDHĀNTA is a conclusion conflicting with one's school of thought. It is included under *svavacana-virodha*.

22. HETVĀBHĀSA-S are fallacies of the probans.²

¹ See next section.

² See third section of this chapter.

Futile Objections (Jāti)

Those objections of an opponent that have not the necessary efficacy to refute the proponent's argument and are accepted as such by both the disputants are called 'Futile Objections' (*jāti*). These are generally intended to score a victory over the proponent in case he is not alert enough to see through the futility and falsity of the objection. The Nyāya school enumerates twenty-four types of *jāti* which Jayatīrtha includes in the defects of inference accepted by him:¹

1. SĀDHARMYA-SAMA: Questioning the proponent's argument with an inference which has no pervasion but bases itself on some similarity, e.g., Proponent: 'This mountain has fire because it has smoke, like the kitchen'. Opponent: 'Let the mountain have no fire because of possessing substantiveness (*dravyatva*), like the lake'.

2. VAIDHARMYA-SAMA: The same as the above except that the argument proceeds on the ground of some dissimilarity, e.g., 'If the mountain has fire because of being dissimilar to the lake in respect of possessing smoke, why cannot the mountain have no fire because of being dissimilar to the kitchen in respect of possessing the attribute 'mountainness'?'

In these two cases, there is no pervasion in the opponent's argument. If the opponent declares that only some similarity or dissimilarity is needed for an inference and not pervasion, it has to be pointed out

¹ PP, pp. 292-347.

that his argument also can be refuted by a counter-argument based on some similarity or dissimilarity without the need of any pervasion. The principle enunciated by the opponent refutes his own inference; hence Jayatīrtha classes these two types of *jāti* under *svanyāya-virodha*.

3. **UTKARṢA-SAMA:** Deducing the existence of some irrelevant things in the subject on the strength of their presence in the example, using the same probans used by the proponent, e.g., 'If the mountain has fire because it has smoke, like the kitchen, then why should it not have cooking vessels also like the kitchen?' Here it may be pointed out that the inference has no pervasion. If the opponent then declares that what is necessary for an inference is the fact of 'being together' and not pervasion, then his argument can be refuted similarly by taking into account 'being together' and not pervasion. This *jāti* can also come under *svanyāya-virodha*.

4. **APAKARṢA-SAMA:** According to some, this is deducing the nonexistence of some admitted attributes in the subject, e.g., 'If sound is noneternal because it is produced, like the pot, then let sound not be an object of hearing because it is produced, like the pot'. Here the purpose of the opponent's argument is to be ascertained. If it be to establish the point that sound is not an object of hearing, then the argument suffers from the defect of *arthāntara*. If it be an argument to refute the proponent, then it is not different from *utkarṣa-sama*. The difference between *utkarṣa-sama* which deduces a

positive attribute and *apakarṣa-sama* which deduces the nonexistence of an admitted attribute, does not count much.

According to Udayana, *apakarṣa-sama* consists in deducing the nonexistence of either the probans or the probandum in the subject on the ground of the absence of certain things found together with either of them in the example, e.g., 'The mountain has no fire, or it has no smoke, because of the nonexistence of the cooking vessels which were found together with smoke and fire in the kitchen'. This is also not sound. If it be an argument to deduce the nonexistence of the probandum, it is not different from *sādharmya-sama* or *prakarṣa-sama*.¹ So it has to be accepted that *apakarṣa-sama* is that argument which seeks to establish the nonexistence of the probans in the subject without accepting the principle of pervasion.

5. VARṆYA-SAMA: According to some, this is stating the objection that the example also is to be proved as having the probandum and the probans just like the subject. If this objection be the result of a genuine doubt regarding the proved existence of the probandum and the probans in the example, then it is not a futile objection. Otherwise there is no reason why such an objection should be made. If the opponent further urges that the probans in the example is to be proved on the ground that in the subject it has the attribute of 'having to be proved', then this is not different from *utkarṣa-sama*.

¹ See below, p. 85.

Udayana defines *varṇya-sama* as follows: Deducing that the probans has the same characteristics in the example as in the subject, including the attribute of 'having to be proved'. The case is argued as follows: If the probans present in the example is the same as the one in the subject, then the probandum in the example also has to be proved as in the subject. If the probans present in the example be other than the one in the subject, it has to be proved afresh.

Here the opponent is to be answered that the mere presence of the probans in the example is enough to vouchsafe its validity. There is no necessity for the probans in the subject to be present in the same form in the example too. If the opponent insists on the presence of the identical form of the probans, then his argument has to be included in *svanyāya-virodha* as the inference advanced by him can also be refuted on the same ground.

6. AVARṆYA-SAMA: According to some this is deducing that the probandum has been already established in the subject because of its being established in the example. If the deduction be made in the belief that the probandum has been established in respect of the subject, it is valid reasoning and therefore ceases to be a futile objection. If it be otherwise, there is no reason why such a deduction should be attempted. If the deduction be based merely on the strength of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum, it is an example of *utkarṣa-sama*.

So Udayana defines *avarṇya-sama* as follows: Deducing the established nature of the probandum in

the subject on the strength of the probans having the same characteristics in the example, such as 'being proved'. If the same probans as related to an established predicate (smoke which is present in the kitchen) is present in the mountain, the probandum as in the example is established in the subject. If it be not so the probandum ceases to be a probandum since there is no probans to prove it. The proponent may here point out that in the opponent's inference, one can deduce the same defect, i.e., the probandum in respect of the subject is established in the example; hence the inclusion of this *jāti* in *svanyāya-virodha*.

7. VIKALPA-SAMA: According to some, this is deducing the inconstancy of the probans and the probandum on the strength of the inconstancy of certain attributes, e.g., 'The attribute "producibility" is found in the pot which is concrete (*mūrta*) as well as in the colour of the pot which is abstract (*amūrta*). On the same ground, let certain things that are produced be eternal and the others noneternal'. Here, if this be a mere doubt, it is answerable. In that case the absence of any adjunct has to be indicated. Further if the opponent holds that his arguments are meant to refute the proponent, then it is to be ascertained if the inconstancy is shown here as a probans or as an example. If it be the probans, it has no pervasion. If it be the example, there is the nonstatement of the probans and so it is *nyūna*. Further it proves to be not different from *prati-dṛṣṭānta-sama*.¹ If the opponent does not agree that

¹ See below, p. 84.

pervasion is necessary for inference, then it proves to be a case of *svanyāya-virodha*.

8. SĀDHYA-SAMA: According to some, this is deducing the unestablished nature of the probandum in the example as in the proposition. This view is not correct. If the argument be stated in order to find out the disputed nature of the probandum, then it is valid. If it be a mere objection, it has no justification.

So Udayana defines *sādhya-sama* as follows: 'Questioning why the probans cannot prove the existence of the subject, the probans itself, and their attributes as well as the probandum'. The answer is that the existence of the subject, etc., is already proved as pervasion and *pakṣadharmatā* (presence in the appropriate place, which is the sense of the term in Madhva's philosophy) are necessary conditions for an inference. If the opponent holds that they are not, it is to be pointed out that his argument can also be refuted by an inference which has no pervasion and *pakṣadharmatā*. So it is included in *svanyāya-virodha*.

9-10. PRĀPTI-SAMA: The refutation of the probans as being a probans on the assumption that the cognition of the probans originates the cognition of the probandum after becoming related to it. APRĀPTI-SAMA: The refutation of the same on the assumption that the cognition of the probans causes that of the probandum without becoming related to it.

If the cognition of smoke gives rise to the cognition of fire after becoming related to it, then it follows that the cognition of fire must have already existed because

it is possible only for existents to become related. Hence the cognition of fire is not caused by the cognition of smoke because the fire cognition is already there. Or, if the cognition of smoke becomes related with fire and then gives rise to the cognition of fire, no other type of relation exists between the cognition of smoke and the fire excepting that of cognition and the object of cognition. The smoke cognition has for its content fire also. Thus there is cognition of fire already established. If it be contended that the cognition of the probans gives rise to the cognition of the probandum without becoming related to it, we should reply that there is no such instance. Fire does not burn a stick without becoming related to it, nor does a lamp illumine an object without becoming related to it.

The proponent replies that the probans gives rise to the cognition of the probandum by its own potency to become related to the probandum. The object of the cognition of smoke is not mere smoke, but smoke as related in the pervasion. If the opponent does not agree to it, it proves to be a case of *svanyāya-virodha* as in the inference used by him there is the same doubt as to whether the probans gives rise to the cognition of the probandum after becoming related to it or before.

11. PRASAṄGA-SAMA: Deducing apparent infinite regress, e.g., when the familiar inference of fire from smoke is stated, the opponent remarks: 'What is it that originated the mountain? What originated that which originated the mountain? Thus it leads to infinite regress.' Here it is to be answered that since an

established thing has a definite ground, it cannot be contested. If the opponent does not agree to this, it should be pointed out to him that his inference also can be refuted for the same reasons; thus it is a case of *svanyāya-virodha*.

12. PRATIDRṢṬĀNTA-SAMA: Some are of the opinion that this is refutation with a counterexample, e.g., 'If sound be noneternal because it is an object of the senses like the pot, then let it be also eternal like the Universal (*sāmānya*)'. This view is not correct as *sādharmya-sama* also has the same function.

Udayana defines *pratidrṣṭānta-sama* as 'Deducing either *satpratīpakṣa* (counterprobans) or *bādha* ('the sublated') on the strength of a counterexample alone without a probans', e.g., 'If the mountain has fire because of the example of the kitchen, then let the mountain have no fire because of the example of the lake'.

This is a case of the omission of the necessary limbs (*nyūna*) as the probans is not stated. If it be contended that the probans is not necessary, then it will come under *svanyāya-virodha* since the opponent's inference can also be refuted by another inference which has no pervasion.

13. ANUTPATTI-SAMA: Deducing the unestablished nature of the probans by pointing out its absence in the subject prior to its origin, e.g., 'Before the origin of the mountain, as there was no smoke in it, it proves to be a partially unestablished case'. Here it is to be pointed out that the absence of the probans from the mountain prior to its origin is not a defect at all because the mountain before its origin is not the subject. If the

opponent does not agree to this, the same objection can be levelled against his inference; so it proves to be a case of *svanyāya-virodha*.

14. SAMŚAYA-SAMA: Deducing doubt merely on the ground of some common attribute despite the presence of the determining factor, e.g., 'If the mountain has fire like the kitchen because the common attribute, 'having smoke', is found in both, a doubt arises as to why the mountain should not be without fire because the common attribute, 'substanceness', is found in the kitchen and in the lake'. Here we must answer that a doubt arises only in the absence of a determining factor aided by a common attribute. In the present case there is the determining factor, so it is not doubt at all. If the opponent says that the presence of the determining factor is not an obstruction to doubt, then we shall have to argue that doubt can be deduced in his argument also on the same ground. Thus this *jāti* is included in *svanyāya-virodha*.

15. PRAKARAṆA-SAMA: Refuting with a counter-inference, e.g., 'If sound is noneternal because it is produced, then let sound be eternal because it is the object of the sense of hearing'. If the counterinference be stated in the belief that it has all the necessary limbs of an inference, then it is not different from *īdhya-sama*.

Udayana defines *prakaraṇa-sama* as follows: 'An attempt to refute the proposition with an argument which is accepted to be not stronger than the proposition'. This is not different from *sādharmya-sama*. If

this is not accepted, it has to be treated as a case of *svanyāya-virodha*.

16. AHETU-SAMA: Deducing the ineffective nature of the probans by refuting the possibility of its origin before the probandum or after it or simultaneously with it. The argument is as follows: 'The probans in its origin as well as in cognition is not prior to the probandum because there cannot be a probans in the absence of a probandum. Nor can it be posterior to the probandum as there cannot be a probandum without a probans. The probans and the probandum could not have come into existence simultaneously or else we would be unable to distinguish which is the probandum and which the probans'. Here the answer should be that the probans in its origin is prior to the probandum and that the probans, by its own potency, gives rise to the cognition of the probandum which exists in concept. As for the probans in cognition, it gives rise to the cognition of the probandum in all the three modes mentioned above. The difference that marks off the probans from the probandum is that the one is known and the other unknown. If the opponent does not agree to this, we can deduce the same defects in his inference; hence it is included in *svanyāya-virodha*.

17. ARTHĀPATTI-SAMA: Deducing something through an apparent presumption, e.g., 'If it is said that the mountain has fire, it follows through presumption (*arthāpatti*) that objects other than the mountain have no fire. So the example, namely, the kitchen, would have the defect of lack of probandum'. Here

it is to be pointed out that when something is unintelligible, the assumption of what will make it intelligible is called presumption. There is nothing unintelligible in the above instance, so there is no need for deduction through presumption. If the opponent holds that anything that is not stated is to be presumed, the same defect can be found in his argument; hence it proves to be a case of *svanyāyā-virodha*.

18. AVIŚEṢA-SAMA: Constructing an argument with a probans which is an attribute other than that adduced by the proponent, and to deduce therefrom nondistinctness of all things possessing that attribute, e.g., 'If the mountain has fire on account of its similarity to the kitchen in respect of possessing smoke, then let all existent things be eternal because of their similarity in respect of existence'. Here it should be pointed out that in the former case there is pervasion between the probans and the probandum whereas in the latter case there is not. If the opponent does not agree to this, the same defect can be deduced in his inference too; hence it is *svanyāyā-virodha*.

19. UPAPATTI-SAMA: Some are of the opinion that confronting the proponent with a reasonable probans which proves just the contrary of what he has stated constitutes this *jāti*, e.g., 'If the noneternality of sound is proved by the probans, producedness, then the eternality of sound too can be proved by the probans, non-touchability'. This is not different from *sādharmya-sama*.

Udayana gives another definition: 'Confronting the proponent with a general statement to the effect

that the opponent also has a probans to prove his point'. In this case, there is no *jāti*. If the probans stated by the opponent be valid, then it is a valid answer; if not, the defect has to be pointed out.

20. UPALABDHI-SAMA: According to some this is deducing the ineffective nature of the probans on the ground of the perception of the probandum in places where the specified probans is not found, e.g., 'The probans "smoke" cannot prove the existence of fire, because fire is found in some places, such as the red hot iron ball, where there is no smoke'. As this can only prove the inability of fire to cause the inference of smoke and not the contrary, this is not *jāti* at all. It can be a case of *hānyādyābhāsa*.

Udayana defines *upalabdhi-sama* as follows: 'Imposing an emphasis either on the subject or the predicate of the proposition and then showing that in either case it is invalid', e.g., when the proponent states that the mountain has fire, the opponent suggests alternatives regarding what is meant by the statement and asks: 'Does the statement mean that the mountain alone has fire or does it mean that the mountain invariably has fire? It cannot be the first because there is fire in the kitchen also. It cannot be the second because the mountain is found even without fire'. This imposition of a restrictive sense not intended by the proponent is a case of *chala* and not of *jāti*.

21. ANUPALABDHI-SAMA: Deducing contradiction in such attributes of the subject as cognition, by supposing their existence or nonexistence in themselves

as *loci*, e.g., 'If it is accepted that cognition is found in itself because of the fact that cognition also is cognized, like the pot, then cognition becomes noncognition. If, on the other hand, cognition is not found in cognition, then also it becomes noncognition'. Here the reply is that the cognitive nature of cognition which is dependent on the object does not lose its cognitive nature whether it exists in itself or not. If the opponent does not agree to this, the same defect can be shown in his argument; so this is a case of *svanyāya-virodha*.

22. NITYA-SAMA: Analyzing the attribute into two forms, namely, the 'that' and the 'not that' and disproving the impossibility of its qualifying the subject, e.g., when the proponent says that sound is noneternal, the opponent asks him whether noneternality itself is eternal or noneternal. If it be eternal, the subject too becomes eternal and if it be noneternal, by the very destruction of noneternality, the sound which is qualified by it becomes eternal. Here if the purpose of such an argument be to deduce the unintelligibility of the proponent's argument, it is valid. If the intention be to refute the existence of the subject as so qualified the opponent must state his own proof at the beginning. If he does not agree to this, it is to be pointed out that the same defect can be found in his argument; so it is included in *svanyāya-virodha* or *svakriyā-virodha*.

23. ANITYA-SAMA: Deducing the attributes of the probandum in all other objects possessing an attribute other than that of the proponent's probandum, e.g., 'If sound is noneternal because it is produced, then let

every object be noneternal because it is existent'. This *jāti* is not different from *aviśeṣa-sama*.

24. KĀRYA-SAMA: According to some, this is deducing the doubtful nature of the probans, e.g., 'Sound is noneternal because it emanates after some effort'. Here the opponent asks: 'Is the emanation of sound after some effort a case of manifestation or origination?' This is a valid objection if it be adduced with a view to prove that the probans is otherwise accounted for.

Udayana defines *kārya-sama* as follows: 'Refuting the opponent's argument by pointing out the unestablished nature of either the subject, the probandum, or what is imagined by oneself to be the probans', e.g., when the proponent says that sound is noneternal because it is produced, the opponent replies that the producibility of the probans is not established. The opponent then suggests a probans, namely, 'emanation with some effort', and he subsequently refutes it by pointing out that it is otherwise accounted for. This is a case of *chala*.

Fallacies (Hetvābhāsa-s)

The twenty-second vulnerable point in the Nyāya list is Hetvābhāsa-s or fallacies of the probans. There is

Hetvābhāsa-s in ancient and modern Nyāya	no unanimity of opinion about their number. Kaṇāda accepts only three, while Gautama and other Naiyāyika-s accept five. The names of the Hetvābhāsa-s are
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not the same in all Nyāya works. *Savyabhīcāra* (or *anaikāntika*), *viruddha*, *prakaraṇasama*, *sādhyasama*, and *atītakāla* are the names accepted by Gautama. Coming to such a late work as the *Tarkasaṃgraha*, we find that the first two have the same names but the latter three different ones. *Prakaraṇasama* is that which leaves the conclusion doubtful, and the probans there proves the probandum of both the proponent and the opponent. This is the same as the 'counterprobans' (*satpratīpakṣa*) of Annambhaṭṭa. The *sādhyasama-hetu* of Gautama is that probans which is as doubtful as the probandum and is the same as the *asiddhi* of Annambhaṭṭa. The *kālātīta* of the former is named *bādhita* ('sublated') by the latter. Some of the ancient Nyāya writers have added *anadhyavasita* to the other fallacies. Śaṃkara Miśra has identified it with *anupasaṃhārin*; therefore it comes under *savyabhīcāra*.

Jayatīrtha gives a sevenfold classification of the fallacies of the probans and then points out their subsumption under the six defects of inference already noted:¹ 1. the unestablished (*asiddha*); 2. the contrary (*viruddha*); 3. the nonconclusive (*anaikānta*); 4. the non-determinate (*anadhyavasita*); 5. the 'adduced out of time' or 'sublated' (*kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*); 6. the counterprobans (*satpratīpakṣa*); 7. the 'similar to the context' (*prakaraṇasama*).

Of these seven we have already pointed out that *anadhyavasita* is the same as *anupasaṃhārin*. *Prakaraṇasama*

¹ PP, p. 351; Janārdana's commentary.

is not different from *satpratīpakṣa* and *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* is another name for *bādhita*. Thus Jayatīrtha's enumeration is not essentially different from the five fallacies as generally found in Nyāya works.

A valid probans has five characteristics: it is present in the subject, and in the example, it is nonexistent in the counterexample, it has a non-sublated probandum and it has no counterprobans refuting it. In the positively and the negatively concomitant probans all the five characteristics are necessary to ensure validity. In the probans whose concomitance is only positive or only negative, four of the above-mentioned characteristics are enough to ensure validity, since the merely positive probans has no counterexample, and the merely negative probans has no positive instance. The absence of a few of the above-mentioned characteristics leads to the defects of the probans which are as follows:

1. The noncognition of the probans as having pervasion and as existing in the subject constitutes *asiddhi*. It is of four kinds: nonestablishment of being pervaded (*vyāpyatvāsiddhi*); nonestablishment of the locus (*āśrayāsiddhi*); nonestablishment of being in the subject (*pakṣadharmatvāsiddhi*); and nonestablishment of the valid cognition of the probans concerned in a particular inference (*etaṭpramītyasiddhi*).

Vyāpyatvāsiddhi is of two kinds. The first has no relation to the probandum, e.g., 'Everything is

momentary because of being existent'. In this inference the probans has no positive or negative pervasion. It comes, therefore, under the defect 'nonpervasion' (*avyāpti*). The second has a relation conditioned by an adjunct (*upādhi*). The adjunct pervades the probandum and does not pervade the probans. In the inference, 'The slaying (of animals) in Vedic sacrifices is sinful because it is slaying, like that of a Brahmin', the adjunct is 'scriptural condemnation'. The adjunct pervades the probandum, i.e., sinfulness: Wherever there is sinfulness there is scriptural condemnation. It does not pervade the probans, i.e., slaughter in Vedic sacrifices. The adjunct does not exist in the subject 'Vedic sacrifices'. The adjunct is the pervader and the probandum is the pervaded. From the nonexistence of the adjunct in the subject we can deduce the nonexistence of the probandum there, as the absence of the pervader leads to the absence of the pervaded. Thus we can show the invalidity of the above by an inference which takes the following form: 'Sacrificial slaughter is not sinful because, like eating, it is not condemned by scripture'. Those cases in which we cognize the adjunct before the debate have the defect of nonpervasion (*avyāpti*), and those inferences in which we cognize the adjunct after the debate have the defect *samabala-pramāṇa-virodha* because the counterinference is as valid as the proponent's inference.

The nonestablishment of the locus (*āśrayāsiddhi*) is of two kinds. The first is that in which the locus is nonexistent, e.g., 'The horns of a hare are sharp, because they are horns, like the horns of a cow'. As it is not

possible to find an example for *āśrayāsiddhi* not intermixed with defects like 'contradiction by valid knowledge', it is not a defect of the probans at all. In the present example as soon as we state the proposition 'the horns of a hare are sharp' we know that it is opposed to the *pramāṇa-s*. From this defect, namely, contradiction to *pramāṇa-s*, the defect of the probans is derived. Hence it is not a defect of the probans. The second kind of *āśrayāsiddhi* is proving the established, e.g., stating before the theist the following inference which proves the existence of God according to the Nyāya school: 'The earth, etc., have an agent because they are effects (created)'. This comes under *asaṅgati*, because it sets out to prove that for which there is no expectancy.

Pakṣadharmatvasiddhi, the nonestablishment of being in the subject, is of several kinds: *svarūpāsiddha* (e.g., 'Sound is eternal because it is an object of the sense of sight'), which is included in *asiddhi*; *vyādhikaraṇāsiddha* (e.g., 'There is rain in the uplands because there is a flood in the river of the lowlands') which is not a defect at all; *vyartha-viśeṣaṇāsiddha* and *vyartha-viśeṣyāsiddha*, which can be classed under the defect of *adhika*; *viśeṣaṇāsiddha*, *viśeṣyāsiddha*, etc., which can also be included in the defect *asiddhi*.

Nonestablishment of the valid cognition of the probans in a particular inference (*etatpramityasiddhi*)¹ is found in the example of the existence of fire inferred from smoke when it is not certain whether it is smoke or vapour. This is included in *avyāpti*.

¹ This type of *asiddhi* is not found in the Nyāya classification.

2. The existence of the probans only in the subject and in the negative instance constitutes the defect *viruddha*, e.g., 'Sound is eternal because it is produced'. This comes under the defect 'nonpervasion' (*avyāpti*) because here the probans is related to the nonexistence of the probandum.

3. The existence of the probans in the subject in the positive instance and in the negative instance is called 'nonconclusive' (*anaikāntika*), e.g., 'Sound is eternal because it is an object of knowledge'. This also is included in *avyāpti* because the probans is related to the probandum as well as to its nonexistence.

4. The probans which is found in the subject alone and is not efficacious in proving the probandum constitutes the defect 'non-determinate' (*anadhyavasita*). It is of three kinds: that which has neither a negative nor a positive instance, e.g., 'All things are noneternal because they are existent'; that which has both the instances, e.g., 'The earth is eternal because it has smell'; and that which is present only in the subject, e.g., 'Sound is nameable because it has sound-ness (*śabdātva*)'. This defect is subsumed under *avyāpti*.

5. The presence of the probans in the subject along with the probandum which is sublated by another *pramāṇa* is called *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*, e.g., 'Fire is not hot because it is a substance'. The probandum here is sublated

by our perception of heat in fire. This is included in *prabala-pramāṇa-virodha*.

6. *Satpratipakṣa* is that probans which is contradicted by another equally strong one, e.g., 'Air is visible because it is known through touch'. This can be contradicted by the statement: 'Air is not visible because it is a substance devoid of colour'. This is included in *pratijñā-virodha*.

7. The probans which proves the probandum of both the opponent and the proponent is called *prakaraṇasama*, e.g., 'That which is under dispute is unreal (*mithyā*) because it is seen'. This probans can prove the reality too. This is also subsumed under the defect *pratijñā-virodha*.

The early Nyāya works include the fallacies of the subject and the example in the fallacies of the probans. But the Mādhva logicians treat them separately.

The fallacies of the subject are cognized by the mere statement of the proposition. They are included under *svakriyā-virodha* and *svanyāya-virodha*, e.g., 'I am dumb'; 'the knowledge of an object does not require the means of knowledge'. Mādhva logicians recognize two fallacies of the example: (1) lack of probandum (*sādhya-vaikalya*), e.g., '*Manas* (the mind) is noneternal because it is concrete like the prime atom'. The atom, i.e., the example, is not noneternal. (2) lack of probans (*sādhana-vaikalya*), e.g., '*Manas* is noneternal because it is concrete like Action'. The probans, i.e.,

concreteness, is not existent in Action. The contention that the defect 'lack of probandum' in an example makes the example the negative instance where the probandum should not exist, which would be a case of the 'nonconclusive' (*anaikānta*) or the 'contradictory' (*viruddha*) and the contention that the defect 'lack of probans' is included in *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*, is not correct; these defects are cognized after the example is stated and not before.

VII

VERBAL TESTIMONY

VERBAL testimony is the third of the *pramāṇa-s* accepted by Madhva. 'Defectless statement' constitutes valid verbal testimony.¹ The seven defects of statement are: nonintelligibility (*abodhakatva*) arising out of the use of meaningless words (*nirabhidheyatva*) or the use of words which have no syntactical relation (*anvayābhāva*); giving rise to erroneous cognition (*viparīta-bodhakatva*); making known that which is already known (*jñāta-jñāpakatva*); conveying the useless (*aprayojanatva*); having an unintended effect (*anabhimata-prayojanatva*); stating that which is incapable of being accomplished (*aśakya-sādhana-pratipādana*); teaching a difficult method when an easy one is available (*laghūpāye sati gurūpāyopadeśa*). Statements without such defects constitute verbal testimony.

A group of letters with a suffix (*sup* or *tin*) constitutes a word. A group of words having expectancy, compatibility and proximity constitutes a sentence. Expectancy is the desire to know. It is, in fact, a quality of the Self. Objects are said to have expectancy only

¹ PP, p. 374.

in a secondary sense. Compatibility is the nonexistence of conflict with any *pramāṇa* even after syntactical relation is cognized. It is an attribute of the word-sense (*padārtha-dharma*). Proximity is the continuous utterance of words. It is an attribute of the words.

There are two kinds of sounds: inarticulate (*dhvanyātmaka*), such as the sound of a bell, and articulate

Two kinds of
sounds

(*varṇātmaka*). The phonemes (*varṇa-s*) are eternal and all-pervasive substances according to Madhva. Though eternal

they manifest themselves through primary sounds (*dhvani-s*) which are noneternal. As soon as they reach the sense of hearing they remind the hearer of the corresponding *varṇa-s*. So the mere presence and eternality of the *varṇa-s* do not give us perpetual cognition of them.

The only type of order that the followers of Madhva recognize in the *varṇa-s* is the order imposed and cognized by the speaker and the hearer (*bauddhika-krama*). No other order is possible among letters because they exist always in all places.

Order in the
Varṇa-s

In every word there are a number of *varṇa-s*. When the second *varṇa* is uttered the first passes out of cognition and all the *varṇa-s* are not present to our cognition simultaneously, i.e., in a single moment we do not cognize all these *varṇa-s* together. How then is it possible for us to perceive the word as a whole?

Experience of the
word as a whole

The Nyāya school maintains that each *varṇa* leaves its impression behind and when the last *varṇa*, aided by

the accumulated impressions of the previous *varṇa-s*, is apprehended, the meaning of the word presents itself. Jayatīrtha criticizes this view as follows: Mere cognition of the word does not in any way help us to cognize its denotation. A pundit who did not know the English language would not be able to cognize the denotation of a word in English though he heard the word.

Nyāya view and
its criticism

Jayatīrtha's contention is that the last *varṇa* in contact with the sense of hearing gives rise to the word-cognition. The sense of hearing is aided by two factors: impressions generated by the previous *varṇa-s* and apprehension of the previous *varṇa-s* and their denotation. In the absence of the knowledge that the word has some meaning there cannot be word-cognition. The Mādhva-s like other Vedāntin-s have taken up the position that *varṇa-s* by some laws of association give rise to the word-cognition.

Jayatīrtha's
contention

The difficulty of this problem led the grammarians to formulate the well-known Sphoṭa doctrine which Jayatīrtha criticizes in the same way as the other Vedāntin-s do.

Grammarians' view

According to Madhva there is no separate sentence-meaning apart from the word-meanings put together.

It is true that a sentence contains not only word-meanings but also their syntactical relation. So the Mādhva-s say that the word itself presents its own meaning and its

Anvitābhidhāna

syntactical relation with other words. The argument is: Words are uttered to communicate our ideas to others. As soon as a word is uttered the hearer's expectancy is roused as to what he has to do with the object which the word denotes; for example, when the word 'pot' is uttered, the hearer's expectancy is unfulfilled. On this ground it is presumed that the word conveys not only its own sense but also its syntactical relation with the objects denoted by other words. Thus every word denotes its own object as well as its relation with the objects denoted by other words, by a single potency. This doctrine is called *anvitābhidhāna-vāda*.

The Prābhākara-s posit a number of potencies in a word and say that each word denotes several syntactical relations. This doctrine is called *viśeṣānvitābhidhāna-vāda*. Madhva criticizes this view as being prolix and posits only a single potency which has the possibility of being determined in a number of ways.

The Bhāṭṭa school holds that words cannot discharge both the functions ascribed to them by the Prābhākara-s. The words of a sentence present primarily their isolated meanings which afterwards combine to produce the particular syntactically related sentence-meaning. The sentence-meaning is not obtained directly from words but indirectly. "Words", according to Kumārila, "are the invariable but not immediate antecedent condition for the understanding of the meaning of a sentence." The idea is further explained by a comparison: "Just as

fuel is indispensable for cooking, though cooking is done not directly by the fuel but through the flame generated by it, so also words are indispensable to the understanding of the meaning of a sentence, but this understanding is not immediately caused by the words but by the meaning they present to the mind." We know by experience that we sometimes understand the meaning of component words but not the meaning of a sentence. This fact indicates that some other condition is necessary for understanding the sentence-meaning. This doctrine of the Bhāṭṭa-s is called *abhihitānvaya-vāda*.

The Mādhva-s criticize the Bhāṭṭa position as follows: The assumption of two potencies, namely, the word-potency and the potency of the word-sense, is prolix. The word-sense gives us the sentence-meaning according to the Bhāṭṭa-s. Is that meaning cognized by perception, inference, or verbal testimony? It cannot be by any one of these because the necessary conditions are absent. Granting that there is some *pramāṇa* for the knowledge there is no reason to class it under verbal testimony.

The grammarians explain the syntactical relation by postulating the *vākya-sphoṭa* which reveals the meaning of the sentence by means of the successive words in the sentence. "Neither the words nor their sequence is futile for the words are the tools of manifestation; the sequence provides the form." The Sphoṭa doctrine points out that meaning is a unit and

Criticism of
Abhihitānvaya

Vākya-sphoṭa
criticized

that the evolution of our knowledge is from the less clear to the more clear. The Mādhva-s criticize the *vākya-sphoṭa* on the ground that there is no separate sentence-sense apart from word-sense and words denote their own sense as well as their syntactical relation.

What does a word denote? The Bhāṭṭa-s are of the opinion that words primarily denote the class and secondarily the particular. The Vaiśeṣika-s say that words denote particulars qualified by the class (*jātivīśiṣṭa-vyakti*).

Views on denota-
tion of word

The grammarians think that words denote sometimes the class and sometimes the particular. Madhva is of the opinion that words denote only particulars. The word 'pot' denotes a particular object of clay. When the individual subsequently perceives similar objects, he learns that such objects are called pots.

Verbal testimony is of two kinds: compositions not having human authorship (*apauruṣeya*) and human compositions (*pauruṣeya*). The Veda-s are of the first kind and all other works are of the second. The Veda-s are also called Śruti-s because they are learnt by ear.

Two kinds of
compositions

Even the seers of the hymns declare that they only discovered their meaning. That they have no human authorship is argued as follows: The Veda-s do not have human authorship because no author has ever been heard of and all have learnt them by ear (*sarvair śrutatvāt*) and orally repeated them (*sarvair uccaritatvāt*).

The authoritative works for Madhva are the four Veda-s, the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata*, the Pāñcarātra

Āgama-s and such parts of the Purāṇa-s as are in harmony with these. Revelation is the ultimate authority in matters of the spirit. Scripture has to be interpreted according to the six determinative marks of purport: the initial and the concluding passages, repetition, novelty, purpose, glorification by eulogistic passages and condemnation by deprecatory ones, and intelligibility in the light of reasoning. Though reasoning is only one among the determinative marks of purport, it still plays a very important role in settling the other points.

Source books
for Madhva

VIII

THE PROBLEM OF VALIDITY

AFTER an analytical study of the three *pramāṇa-s*, Jayatīrtha examines the problem of validity and invalidity, which in general is whether the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of the knowledge attained by the *pramāṇa-s* has its origin (*utpatti*) through the very conditions which make the knowledge itself possible, or by any external condition; or, whether the ascertainment (*jñapti*) of the validity of the knowledge is through the very conditions which make us ascertain the knowledge, or by any external condition. Indian epistemology clearly recognizes this twofold problem relating to the validity of the *pramāṇa-s*: the origination of validity (*prāmāṇyasya utpatti*) and the ascertainment of validity (*prāmāṇyasya jñapti*). Such a recognition points out that Indian philosophers did not “confuse mere psychological belief with logical certainty”.¹

Validity and invalidity are attributes that are present in knowledge and its instruments. The validity of knowledge which does not owe its origin to any factors other than those that gave rise to the knowledge is said to be intrinsic with reference to origin (*utpattau svatastva*).

¹ *The Six Ways of Knowing*, p. 328.

The validity which is cognized without the aid of any external factor other than those which made us cognize the knowledge is said to be intrinsic with reference to ascertainment (*jñaptau svatastva*). The validity which owes its origin to factors other than those that gave rise to the knowledge is said to be extrinsic with reference to origin (*utpattau paratastva*); for example, when the organ of sight gives rise to the cognition of a pot, it is not the sense organ itself which gives rise to the validity in the knowledge but the *guṇa* (the special merit) of the sense organ. Therefore, the validity is extrinsic. The validity which we cognize through an instrument other than the one through which we cognize the knowledge is said to be extrinsic with reference to ascertainment (*jñaptau paratastva*).¹

Jayatīrtha gives the opinions of different schools on this problem. The Nyāya school is of the opinion that validity and invalidity are originated as well as ascertained by conditions external to the instruments of knowledge. This doctrine is called *prāmāṇyasya paratastva-vāda*. The position is defended as follows: If the validity and invalidity of knowledge were intrinsic, then no knowledge could be false. As this is not the case we must assume that some external condition determines validity and invalidity. The validity or invalidity of knowledge is inferred through agreement or disagreement with experience (*saṃvāda* and *viśaṃvāda*).

Nyāya theory of
validity

¹ PP, p. 448.

As against this view, the Mīmāṃsaka-s and the Advaitin-s hold that truth is organic to knowledge and that error creeps in as a result of some hindrance in the way of knowledge. They hold that invalidity is extrinsic and that validity is intrinsic. If validity is accepted to be extrinsic, there is infinite regress because the validity of perceptual knowledge is ascertained through inference, the validity of inferential knowledge is ascertained by a third type of knowledge the validity of which is ascertained by a fourth, and so on *ad infinitum*. In order to avoid all these difficulties validity is accepted as intrinsic.¹

The Bhāṭṭa school holds that knowledge as qualified by validity is inferred through a certain 'cognizedness' (*jñātātā*) and this is the intrinsicity of validity.² Here the validity is intrinsic only in name. The very fact that it has to be inferred is tantamount to the acceptance of the doctrine of extrinsicity because validity is cognized through this 'cognizedness' which is other than cognition.

The Prābhākara-s say that valid cognition results from the knowledge itself and there is no invalidity of knowledge at all.³ This has been refuted by Jayatirtha.

¹ *The Six Ways of Knowing*, pp. 332-5.

² PP, p. 448. Hence it follows that the same *pramāṇa* cognizes knowledge and its validity. The Bhāṭṭa interpretation of the term *svataṣṭva* is different from that of Madhva because of the acceptance of 'cognizedness' by the former.

³ PP, p. 448.

The Mādhva-s are of the opinion that validity is intrinsic with reference to origin and ascertainment.

The Siddhānta of
the Mādhva-s

The validity that is present in cognition is originated as well as ascertained by the instrument which gives rise to and ascertains the cognition. Knowledge and its validity are cognized by the 'witness consciousness' (*sākṣin*). As for invalidity, it is originated by the defects associated with the instruments of knowledge. The *sākṣin* cognizes the cognition aspect of invalid cognition, and the invalidity in it is inferred.¹ The invalidity in the instruments (*karana-s*) of knowledge is originated by external defects; hence it is extrinsic. The cognition of the instruments of knowledge and the potency in them which is responsible for valid knowledge (*karāṇagata-prāmāṇya*) are ascertained through different factors. The instruments of cognition such as the outer sense organs are cognized through inference with the help of a probans like colour, taste and sound. *Manas* is cognized by the *sākṣin*. Instruments like the probans and words are cognized through sense organs like sight and hearing. The potency which is responsible for valid knowledge is inferred through tests of workability, etc. Hence the potency in the instruments is said to be extrinsic with reference to ascertainment.

The scriptures speak of the soul as experiencing and enjoying things even after the destruction of the subtle body (*liṅga-śarīra*), which consists of the ten sense organs, five vital airs and the *manas*. This fact

¹ PP, p. 461, and comm. of Rāghavendra, p. 462.

points out that the soul's form (*svarūpa*) has the capacity of a sense organ. This cognitive faculty of the soul

Acceptance of
Sākṣin based on
scripture

which is not different from its form, is called *sākṣin*.¹ It is with this body as sense organ that the liberated souls experience and enjoy the pleasures in liberation (*mokṣa*). This *sākṣin* has not only the power to cognize objects other than itself but also the power to cognize itself. It is not a sense organ like the *manas* which is different from the soul. The authority for the existence of the *sākṣin* is scripture. In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (3. 5), liberated souls who are free from the trammels of the physical sense organs are still said to enjoy the objects according to their will. This can be done only through the *sākṣin* and not through the *manas* since the latter is destroyed at the moment of liberation.

It is this *sākṣin* which cognizes the knowledge originated by the *pramāṇa-s*. It has been already said that knowledge and its validity are intrinsic. All the three *pramāṇa-s* can originate knowledge as well as its validity but someone has to cognize both; it is the *sākṣin*.

The Nyāya school accepts 'reflective cognition' (*anuvyavasāya*) which is originated by the *manas*. *Anuvy-*

Reflective cognition
and Sākṣin

vāsāya is the cognition of knowledge which also cognizes the validity in it. Like Murāri, the Mīmāṃsaka, Madhva recognizes the intrinsic nature of validity and of reflective cognition. But he holds that it is the *sākṣin* and not the *manas* which gives rise to reflective cognition.

¹ PP, p. 126.

The acceptance of the *sākṣin* is supported by the argument that if we do not assume its existence, we shall not be able to cognize Time, Space, knowledge of the Self, the validity of cognition, etc. The Nyāya school proves the existence of Time through inference. According to Madhva, the inference can prove the existence of Time but cannot help us to cognize Time. Further the validity inherent in its cognition can be cognized only by the *sākṣin*.

It is a common experience to recollect pleasant sleep in the form, 'Till now I have slept pleasantly'.

The *Sākṣin's* experience An analysis of this experience tells us that it is the *sākṣin* that cognizes it.

All the senses including the *manas* are inactive in sleep. Inference is impossible because the subject term is not cognized. The subject term must be 'I' or 'Time'. Both of them are cognized by the *sākṣin* alone. Verbal testimony is of no use in this experience. So Madhva asserts that it is due to the *sākṣin* alone.¹

The *sākṣin-s* are many in number. They differ with each individual; otherwise, the differences in individual experiences cannot be accounted for. It is the *sākṣin* that illumines all the experiences of the individual self.

¹ Regarding the functions of the *sākṣin*, see chapter on Perception.

CONCLUSION

THE distinctive contributions of Madhva to epistemology may be summarized as follows:

Definition proceeds on the basis of similarity (*sādrśya*) and not on the basis of the presence of the common attribute (*sādhāraṇa-dharma*) in the objects defined.

The classification of *pramāṇa* into *kevala* and *anu* has cleared the ambiguity associated with the word *pramāṇa*.

The theory of error, *abhinava-anyathākhyāti*, represents the extent to which radical realism can lead. The Nyāya school attempted to give a completely objective basis to error but Madhva admits the possibility of the immediate cognition of nonexistence (*asat*) also.

Dream knowledge and Recollection are valid because they conform to the definition of *pramāṇa*, namely, *yathārtha-jñāna*.

The doctrine of indeterminate perception is rejected. Perception and percept (the cognition that results from it) are graded according to clarity, which depends on the merit of the cognizer (*pramātā*). Reflective cognition is admitted, but the doctrine of the *manas* being its cause is rejected. The *sākṣin* is responsible for it.

The Nyāya definition of *pakṣadharmatā* has been improved upon so as to include all valid inference. It

is defined as *ucita-deśa-vṛttitva* (presence in an appropriate place).

Madhva rejects negative pervasion. He expresses two negative ideas in the form of a positive pervasion.

The twenty-four *jāti-s* and the twenty-two vulnerable points enumerated by the Nyāya school are subsumed under the six defects, *asaṅgati*, *viruddha*, *adhika*, *nyūna*, *saṃvāda* and *anukti*.

Like other Vedāntin-s, Madhva holds that the scriptures do not have human authorship. The *varṇa-s* are admitted to be eternal and pervasive. Madhva rejects the Sphoṭa doctrine of the grammarians. But his acceptance of the word as expressing not only the individual meaning but the syntactical relation in which the word stands points to the fact that meaning is a unity.

Madhva is of the opinion that validity is intrinsic with reference to origin and ascertainment. Invalidity is originated by the defects associated with the instruments of knowledge. The existence of the *sākṣin* is accepted.

APPENDIX I

The Category of Difference in Vedānta

THE logical category of Difference (*bheda*) is discussed by all the schools of Vedānta. The central doctrine of Advaita Vedānta is the identity of the individual soul with Brahman and that doctrine cannot be conclusively established without proving the untenability of the concept of difference. The schools of Rāmānuja and Madhva have defended the validity of the concept. The deep interest evinced by the absolutistic as well as the theistic schools of Vedānta in the discussion of the question of *bheda* arises out of the logical needs of their respective systems.

The strongest arguments against the intelligibility and ultimate reality of Difference are those of the Advaita Vedāntin. Difference is essentially a relation. There cannot be a relation without two relata. In the absence of difference there cannot be a pluralistic universe with objects differing from one another. The Realist holds that perception, the primary *pramāṇa*, establishes the world of plurality. Hence what is established by a valid instrument of knowledge is also valid and real. So perception seems to contradict the Advaita view. The Advaitin meets the argument in two ways. He denies the Realist's contention that perception establishes a world of plurality with distinct

objects differing from one another. Maṇḍana, the great elder contemporary of Śaṅkara, holds that perception does not cognize Difference. The argument is as follows: There are two types of perception, the *nirvikalpaka* and the *savikalpaka* (the indeterminate and the determinate). The Advaitin recognizes the reality of the indeterminate perception which presents to us not a differentiated, pluralistic universe but a single, positive, undifferentiated continuum. The determinate perception which presents the world of apparent plurality is not real.

The second line of argument is as follows: Granting that perception presents a world of distinct objects, it is by no means necessary that it should be accepted as final. Perception is undoubtedly a basic *pramāṇa* but it does not follow that it is unsublatable. "Where a subsequent cognition arises validly, and it cannot arise except as sublating what goes before, the earlier cognition should necessarily be taken to be sublated; for example, the cognition of nacre could not arise, if the original cognition of silver persisted; hence, the nacre-cognition is admitted to sublimate the earlier silver-cognition. Thus, the priority of perception would of itself be an argument for its sublation by the subsequently resulting scriptural knowledge."¹

Inference cannot establish what perception has failed to do. Perception is the basis of inference. Besides, inference is not the *pramāṇa* to be used in

¹ S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Introduction to the translation of the *Bhāmātī*, Theosophical Publishing House, Madras, 1933, p. xvi.

establishing the concept of difference because such an inference presupposes difference as it depends on the invariable concomitance of the probans and the probandum. A *pramāṇa* that presupposes difference cannot be made use of to refute or establish Difference.

Scripture, the most important of all the *pramāṇa-s*, is in favour of difference, according to the Realists. The Advaitin holds the view that the prime purport of scripture is the identity of the individual soul with Brahman. Scripture in itself is but an array of words. It has to be interpreted by an agent. Interpretation follows the six traditional determinative marks of purport. Śaṅkara holds that a scientific use of the determinative marks of purport shows that identity is the purport of scripture, as in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* "That thou art (*tattvamasi*)". This statement is repeated nine times to show that it is important and that it is the prime purport of the Veda. This teaching is not a mere restatement because the identity of the individual soul with Brahman is not known through ordinary experience, like the heat of fire. The knowledge of the identity is useful because it helps us to enjoy bliss and be free of the cycle of births and deaths. The knowledge of identity is praised and its opposite deprecated.¹

As for the scriptural statements that speak of difference, the Advaitin contends that these speak of difference at the empirical level which is refuted later. This method is called '*adhyāropa* and *apavāda*' and it is adopted in order to establish truth firmly.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. xv.

The Advaitin further contends that reason (*upapatti*), the chief determinative mark of purport, is against the acceptance of difference. The following argument is from Maṇḍana: Difference must either be the nature of things or their attribute. If it were the nature of things, no entity could remain single and whole as it would break itself into a number of things because difference is of its nature. This differentiation could go on endlessly and would not rest even with the primal atom. Hence difference cannot be the nature of things.

Nor can it be the attribute of the things that are related. If it is, we have to know whether the attribute is different from the substrate or is of its very nature. If the attribute is different from the substrate, there are three entities: the substrate, the difference which is the attribute, and the difference of the attribute from the subject. The enquiry into the relation of this difference to the substrate on the one hand and the attribute on the other shows that there is infinite regress. Thus it follows that the category of Difference is only an appearance and not real.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja is not totally against identity of any type. The Brahman of Rāmānuja may be described as an organic whole having for its outer cover (*prakara*) the souls (*cit*) and matter (*prakṛti*). Viewed as the qualified whole (*viśiṣṭadr̥ṣṭyā*) there is identity. When viewed as having attributes (*viśeṣanadr̥ṣṭyā*) there is difference between the souls and Brahman. This doctrine, in spite of the protestations

of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin-s, comes very near to the doctrine of identity-in-difference (Bhedābheda).

Madhva holds the view of absolute difference (*atyanta-bheda*). For Madhva there are no two things alike. The objects of the world are entirely different from one another and their attributes are also different. Difference, which is fivefold, is fundamental to reality. The Dvaita Vedāntin answers the criticism levelled by Maṇḍana as follows: Difference is of the very nature of the thing (*svarūpa*); yet it is possible to effect differentiation between the thing and Difference. To explain this fact Madhva posits a category called *viśeṣa* whose function is to effect differentiation where there is no real difference.

As against the Advaitin's contention that scripture merely elaborates phenomenal difference and then refutes it, the Dvaitin asserts that there is nothing to prevent him from holding the opposite view, i.e., that the *abheda* can be construed as phenomenal and the *bheda* texts as refuting them. Further, there is no necessity for the elaboration of what is obvious. Thus Madhva interprets the Śruti-s with the help of the six determinative marks of purport in the dualist manner. He says that all scriptural statements have difference as their purport and there is no scriptural authority for identity. The great Dvaita dialectician Vyāsayati in his *Nyāyāmṛta* has set down a number of inferences to prove the validity of the concept of difference.

APPENDIX II

God in Dvaita Vedānta

REALITY is classified by Madhva into two distinct categories, the dependent and the independent. Lord Viṣṇu is the independent and central category and the God of Dvaita Vedānta. He is conceived of as the supreme and perfect individual. He is the abode of an infinite number of infinite auspicious attributes. Madhva in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra-s*, points out that all the terms used in human and social intercourse primarily connote Viṣṇu. This is the grand harmonization (*samanvaya*) effected in the first chapter of the *Vedānta-sūtra-s*.

The establishment of the central category is not through bare logic but through the interpretation of the scriptures. Madhva does not credit all that is said in the scriptures nor does he consider all scriptures as authoritative. The purportful scriptures alone are relied upon. Following the strict laws of interpretation, Madhva has pointed out that the central category referred to in the scriptures is not the attributeless Absolute of the Advaitin. The second *sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa characterizes the central reality as the creator, sustainer, destroyer, bestower of knowledge, liberator, etc., of the universe. The third *sūtra* points out that

we can cognize this central reality only through the study of the Śāstra-s. Madhva has effected a textual synthesis of different scriptures and has propounded a metaphysical system with Lord Viṣṇu as the central category.

The Lord is said to be the efficient cause of the universe and not its material cause as this would lead to the absurd conclusion that he is transformed every moment. The Lord is also spoken of as the bestower of *sattā* (being) to all souls. Although he can do anything he wishes, the scriptures declare that he has a law all his own and never deviates from it. He is spoken of as *satya-saṅkalpa*, i.e., his will is always true. He possesses knowledge of the true nature (*svarūpa*) of souls. Perception of the nature of the self is liberation, which no soul can hope to have without the Grace of the Lord. God is not responsible for the difference in the intrinsic nature of souls. He is impartial and disinterested.

Lord Viṣṇu is different from the universe of souls and matter which are all equally real. The presiding deity of *Prakṛti* is Lakṣmī, the consort of Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu is other than and superior to the perishable and imperishable elements in creation. These facts are emphasized by Madhva with the aid of profuse citations from the scriptures. The last five verses of the fifteenth chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā* are said to summarize the purport of the scriptures.

The chief objection of the Advaitin to the admission of infinite attributes to Brahman is that Brahman

does not admit of any relation. For the Advaitin there is nothing outside Brahman as Brahman is an impartite entity. It is not a knowing entity, nor a conscious entity nor an infinite entity, but it is knowledge, is consciousness and is infinitude. Madhva also does not admit any real difference in the attributes of the Lord. The attributes of the Lord are not entirely different from him but they are still distinguishable through the category of *viśeṣa*.

The apparently negative descriptions of Brahman in the scriptures are interpreted by Madhva in a new way. It is possible to charge him with torturing the texts but the same can be said of every school of Vedānta. Dvaita Vedānta is a perfect type of theism wherein God is all in all.